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USUFRUCT: GENERAL PRINCIPLES
LOUISIANA AND COMPARATIVE LAW
A. N. Yiannopoulos*
INTRODUCTION: PERSONAL SERVITUDES AS DISMEMBERMENTS
OF OWNERSHIP
The right of ownership, which according to traditional
civilian analysis includes the elements of usus, fructus, and
abusus,' may lawfully be dismembered in a variety of ways
either by the intention of the owner 2 or by operation of law.3
Book II, Title III, of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 deals
specifically with three permissible dismemberments of the right
of ownership: usufruct, use, and habitation.4 These dismember-
ments of ownership are real rights5 of enjoyment which, by their
1. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 491 (1870) : "Perfect ownership gives the right to
use, to enjoy and to dispose of one's property in the most unlimited manner
* . ."; Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 137 La. 724, 736, 67 So. 641, 645
(1915) : "As stated by article 491 of the Code, ownership is composed of the
rights to use, to enjoy, and to dispose of. These three constituent elements of
the ownership bear in the civil law the designation given to them in the Roman
law: The usus, the fructus, and abusus...."; In re Morgan R & S.S. Co., 32
La. Ann. 371, 375 (1880), quoted in Reagan v. Murphy, 235 La. 529, 105 So. 2d
210 (1958) and Harwood Oil and Mining Co. v. Black, 240 La. 641, 124 So. 2d
764 (1960) : "The rights of use, enjoyment, and disposal are said to be the three
elements of property to things."
2. For the limits of the owner's freedom to create real rights other than those
regulated in the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, see YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW
PROPERTY § 96 (1966). See also text at notes 213-227 infra.
3. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 223, 916 (1870) ; Yiannopoulos, Legal Usufruct;
Louisiana and Comparative Law, to be published in a forthcoming issue of this
Review.
4. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 533-645 (1870). See also FRENCH CIVIL CODE,
bk. II, tit. III, arts. 578-624 (usufruct) ; arts. 625-636 (use and habitation);
B.G.B., bk. III, ch. 5, §§ 1030-1089 (usufruct) ; §§ 1090-1093 (limited personal
servitudes, including habitation); GREEK CIVIL CODE, bk. III, ch. 8, arts. 1142-
1182 (usufruct); arts. 1183-1187 (habitation) ; arts. 1188-1191 (limited personal
servitudes).
5. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 490(2) (1870) : "... any real rights towards
a third person; as a usufruct, use or servitude"; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1904
(1870) : "Contracts, as to their effects upon property or real rights, are of two
kinds: 1. Such as purport a transfer of that which is the object of the contract.
2. Such as only give a temporary right of enjoyment of it." See also id. arts.
487, 2012; Gibson v. Zylks, 186 La. 1043, 1054, 173 So. 757, 761 (1936) ("The
usufruct of immovable property is a real right, Civ. Code art. 2012, and as such
passes with the property to the heirs") ; Perin v. MeMicken's Heirs, 15 La. Ann.
154 (1860) (usufructuary has a real right). For the notion of real right, see in
general, YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY §§ 87, 90 (1966).
In article 2012 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, the rights of usufruct,
use, and habitation are declared to be "examples" of 'real obligations" created by
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nature, confer direct and immediate authority over a thing be-
longing to another person.6 They are distinguished from personal
(obligatory) rights of enjoyment, such as those arising under
leases 7 or loans for use,8 which confer authority merely over
the person of a determined debtor who has assumed the obliga-
tion to allow the enjoyment of a thing by his creditor.9
Usufruct, use, and habitation, though clearly real rights, are
termed in the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 "personal servi-
tudes."' 0 This terminology follows the Romanist tradition" and
"alienating to one person the immovable property, and to another, some real
right to be exercised upon it." While the notion and function of real obligations
is an involved matter in civilian theory (see YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROP-
ELTY § 112 (1966)), the nature of usufruct, use, and habitation as real obliga-
tions under the Louisiana Civil Code should not give rise to difficulties. Article
2012 merely means that the acquirer of land subject to a real right of personal
or predial servitude incurs duties incidental and correlative to the rights of the
holder of the servitude. These duties are "real" in the sense that the landowner
is not personally liable with his entire patrimony and that they are transferable
to successors by particular title as burdens on the land. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts.
2010, 2015 (1870). By abandoning the land to the obligee, the landowner may
relieve himself of all responsibility. Accurate language, therefore, ought to in-
dicate that usufruct, use, and habitation are real rights rather than real obliga-
tions; but these real rights involve incidental and correlative duties which may
be termed "real obligations." Be it as it may, the notion of real obligations is
an awkward analytical tool which can be fully dispensed with. See YIANNOPOULOS,
loc. cit. supra.
6. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 88, text at note 43 (1966)
ef. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 556 (1870) : "The usufructuary can maintain all actions
against the owner and third persons, which may be necessary to insure him the
possession, enjoyment and preservation of his right."
7. On the nature of predial leases as personal rights, see YIANNOPOULOS,
CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 95 (1966). See also LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2692 (1870) :
"The lessor is bound from the very nature of the contract, and without any clause
to that effect: 1. To deliver the thing leased to the lessee. 2. To maintain the
thing in a condition such as to serve for the use for which it is hired. 3. To
cause the lessee to be in a peaceable possession of the thing during the con-
tinuance of the lease." Thus, in contrast with the usufructuary, the lessee does
not enjoy the protection of real actions. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art.
3656 (1960).
8. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2893 (1870) : "The loan for use is an agreement,
by which a person delivers a thing to another, to use it according to its natural
destination, or according to the agreement, under the obligation on the part of the
borrower, to return it after he shall have done using it."
9. On the nature of personal obligations, see YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW
PROPERTY §§ 86, 90 (1966).
10. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 646 (1870) : "All servitudes which affect lands
may be divided into two kinds, personal and real. Personal servitudes are those
attached to the person for whose benefit they are established, and terminate
with his life. This kind of servitude is of three sorts: usufruct, use and habita-
tion." Use of the word "personal" to qualify both rights and servitudes is con-
fusing. Actually, the distinction of servitudes into personal and predial has
nothing to do with the distinction of rights into personal and real. Personal
rights are termed "personal" because they confer authority over the person of
the debtor. Personal servitudes, on the other hand, are termed "personal" because
they are in favor of a person.
11. See 10 DEMOLOmBE, TRAITt DE LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS 169 (1874-82)
JOLOWICZ, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 282 (2d ed.
1952) ; SOHM-MITEIS-WENOER, INSTITUTIONEN 325 (17th ed. 1923). Modern re-
1967] USUFRUCT: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 371
accords with the terminology employed in Germany 12 and Greece.' 8
The redactors of the French Civil Code, however,- have avoided
the appellation "personal servitudes" in order to prevent con-
fusion with reprobated feudal tenures which were suppressed by
the Revolution.'1 French commentators, following the civilian
tradition, do not hesitate to refer to usufruct, use, and habita-
tion as personal servitudes. 15
Usufruct, use, and habitation are personal servitudes in the
sense that they are "attached to the person for whose benefit
they are established, and terminate with his life."' 6 They are
distinguished from predial servitudes which are charges "laid on
an estate for the use and utility of another estate belonging to
another owner.' 7
Usufruct, use, and habitation are the only personal servitudes
regulated in the French and the Louisiana Civil Codes. Question,
therefore, has arisen as to the freedom of interested parties to
create new kinds of personal servitudes. Articles 64618 and 70919
search, however, shows conclusively that usufruct was not a servitude in classical
Roman law. See SCHULZ, CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW 382 (1951); Buckland, The
Conception of Usufruct in Classical Law, 43 L. Q. REV. 326-48 (1927). Kagan,
The Nature of Servitudes and the Association of Usufruct with Them, 22 TUL.
L. REV. 94-110 (1947).
12. See WOLFF-RAISER, SACHENRECHT 431 (10th ed. 1957). In the text of the
B.G.B., usufruct is not expressly designated as a "personal" servitude. Book III,
ch. 5, dealing with servitudes (§§ 1018-1093) is subdivided into predial servitudes
(§§ 1018-1029), usufruct (§§ 1030-1089), and limited personal servitudes (§§ 1090-
1093). German writers today refer to usufruct by its name rather than by the
generic "personal servitude." See BAUR, LEIIRBUCH DES SACHENRECHTS 259 (2d
ed. 1963).
13. Book III, ch. 8 of the Greek Civil Code, bears the heading "Personal
Servitudes." It deals with usufruct (arts. 1142-1182) ; habitation (arts. 1883-1187),
and limited personal servitudes (arts. 1188-1191).
14. See 2 TOULLIER, DROIT CIVIL FRAN ATS 94 (1833).
15. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 753
(2d ed. Picard 1952). The authors indicate, however, that according to recent
practice in France the term "servitude" is reserved for predial servitudes. Usu-
fruct, use, and habitation are referred to by their proper name rather than collec-
tively as personal servitudes.
16. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 646(2) (1870).
17. Id. art. 647.
18. See id. 646(2) : "Personal servitudes are those attached to the person for
whose benefit they are established, and terminate with his life. This kind of
servitude is of three sorts: usufruct, use and habitation." However, argument may
be made that the enumeration is merely indicative. See text at notes 23-28 infra.
19. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 709(l) (1870) : "Owners have a right to estab-
lish on their estates, or in favor of their estates, such servitudes as they deem
proper; provided, nevertheless, that the services be not imposed on the person or
in favor of the person, but only on an estate or in favor of an estate; and pro-
vided, moreover, that such services imply nothing contrary to public order."
However, argument may be made that this article merely prohibits the resurrec-
tion of feudal tenures. See note 20 infra.
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of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, and article 68620 of the
French Civil Code, seem to exclude this freedom. Nevertheless,
French courts and commentators are in accord today that charges
may be laid on an estate in favor of a person: these are real
rights of limited enjoyment, expiring with the life of the bene-
ficiary in the absence of contrary stipulation. 21 And, in Louisiana,
* special legislation and jurisprudence relying on articles 754 to
758 of the Civil Code allow, within certain limits, the creation
of personal servitudes other than usufruct, use, or habitation. 22
Articles 754 to 758 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 have
no equivalent in the French Civil Code. They were first intro-
duced in the 1825 Louisiana Code on the basis of the text of
Toullier.23 The primary purpose of these articles is to furnish
20. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 686, reading precisely as article 646 of the
Louisiana Civil Code, quoted note 19 supra. This article has been interpreted in
France as prohibiting services imposed on a person in favor of another person,
or on an estate in favor of a person and his heirs. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT,
TRAITtL PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 918, 921 (2d ed. Picard 1952) ; 2
TOULLIER, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 94, 95 (1833) ; 3 id. at 401, n. 1.
21. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITIt PRATIQUE DE DRO1T CIVIL FRANVAIS 927
(2d cd. Picard 1952). The authors refer to real rights laid on an estate in favor
of a person by the generic "rights of use." In France, limited real rights of en-joyment may indeed be classified as rights of use. Article 628 of the Civil Code,
corresponding to article 631(1), first paragraph, of the Louisiana Civil Code of
1870, provides: "The rights to use and habitation are regulated by the title which
has established them, and receive accordingly a more or less extensive sense." In
Louisiana, however, article 626 of the Civil Code gives a rather narrow definition
of use and article 631(1), second paragraph, declares that "these conventions do
not exceed the limits of the laws on use and habitation, for if they do, they create
other rights." None of these provisions has an equivalent in the French Civil
Code. Argument could be made, therefore, that limited real rights of enjoyment
in Louisiana are "other rights" rather than "use." For discussion of the more
general question of whether owners may create real rights other than those regu-
lated in the French Civil Code, see YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 87,
text at nn. 30-42 (1966).
22. See, in general, LA. R.S. 19:2 (1950) (expropriation of ownership or
servitudes by public corporations and public utilities) ; id. 2:82, 389 (expropria-
tion of air rights) ; id. 12:328 (electric cooperatives) ; id. 38:2334 (Sabine River
Authority); id. 45:64 (irrigation canals); id. 48:833 (servitudes for highway
purposes). These so-called "servitudes" in favor of public utilities are not predial
servitudes under the Civil Code because they are not charges laid on an estate
"in favor of an estate." LA. CIVIL CODE art. 648 (1870). Nor are they equivalent
to common law "easements." Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Cutrer, 30 So. 2d
864 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1947). They should rather be classified as limited personal
servitudes, real rights of enjoyment in favor of a person, governed by the rules
of the Civil Code pertaining to both predial and personal servitudes, applied by
analogy. See note 35 infra. C7f. Rock Island, A. & L. R.R. v. Gournay, 205 La.
16 4, 17 So. 2d 21 (1944) (railroad right-of-way) ; Tate v. Ville Platte, 44 So. 2d
360 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1950) (pipeline servitude in favor of town) ; Arkansas
Louisiana Gas Co. v. Cutrer, 30 So. 2d 864 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1947) (pipeline
servitude) ; Tennessee Gas Transmisison Co. v. Bayles, 74 F. Supp. 258 (W.D.
La. 1947) (pipeline servitude).
23. See 1 LA. LEGAL ARCHIVES, PROJET OF THE CIVIL CODE OF 1825 p. 82
(1937). Articles 754, 755, and 756 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 reproduce,
almost verbatim, the text of Toullier. See 2 TOULLIER, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 167
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rules of interpretation as to the type of rights created by juri-
dical acts in the absence of express designation. At the same
time, these articles authorize by clear implication the creation
of servitudes in favor of a person in the form of limited rights
of enjoyment. Article 757 thus declares that "if the owner of a
house near a garden or park, should stipulate for the right of
walking and gathering fruits and flowers therein, this right
would be considered personal to the individual, and not a servi-
tude of the house or its owner. But the right becomes real and is
a predial servitude, if the person stipulating for the servitude,
acquires it as owner of the house, and for himself, his heirs and
assigns. ''24
(1833) : "Si la concession enonce qu'il est concede pour l'utilit6 d'un autre fonds.
it ne peut y avoir de doute, quand m~me le droit ne 8crait pas qualifi6 de servitude.
Cette qualification n'est pas neceasaire: tout service impose sur un fonds en faveur
d'un autre fonds, est essentiellement une servitude. La nature d'un droit se deter-
mine par sa qualitd plut6t que par la denomination qu'on lui a donnde" (art. 754) ;
"Si l'acte n'dnoncait pas que ce droit est concdde pour l'utilitd de tel h6ritage,
mais en faveter de telle personne qui en est propridtaire, it faudrait considdrer si,
par sa nature, le droit concddd procure une utilitd refle d l'heritage, ou seulement
un agrdment personnel 4 l'individu propridtaire" (art. 755); "Dons ic premier
cas, on doit prdsumer que le droit concede est une servitude reflle, quoiqu'on ne
lui en ait pas donnd cc nom. . . . It en eat de mme si, possedant une 9naison
contigud 4 des terres riveraines d'une grande route, j'ai atipuld le droit do passer
sur ces terres, sans exprimer que ta passage eat pour le service de ma maison:
car il est evident qu'elle retire une utilitd rdelle de cc passage" (art. 756). For
the text of Toullier corresponding to articles 757 and 758 of the Louisiana Civil
Code of 1870, see notes 24 and 26 infra.
24. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 757 (1870) ; cf. 2 TOULLIEIR, DuOIT CIVIL FRANAIS
167 (1833) : "Au contraire, ai, par sa nature, la concession ne parait procurer
qu'un agrdment personnel 4 l'individu, elle ne pent etre considerd que comme
atipulde en faveur de la peraonne, et ne pent 6tre rendue rdelle que par une
dnonciation exprease.
"Par example, si le propridtaire d'une maison voisine d'un pare, d'un jardin,
stipule le droit d'y passer, de s'y promener, d'V cduillir des fruits, des fleurs, la
concession sera considerde comme un droit personnel 4 l'individu; cc na sera point
une servitude, parce que le Code prescrit formellement les servitudes personnelles.
...Mais le droit pourrait tre rendu rdelle, et deviendrait une veritable servitude
prddiale, si j'avais stipulM, comme propridtaire de la maison, pour moi et mes
successeurs on ayants-cause."
Toullier states, in the sequence of the passage, that personal servitudes other
than usufruct, use, or habitation are forbidden by the Code and that rights of
enjoyment which do not qualify as predial servitudes, usufruct, use, or habitation
are necessarily obligations. See 2 TOULLIER, DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 167 (1833):
"Ainsi l'acqudreur du pare ne aerait point obligd de soufrir l'exercise d'un pareil
droit, d moins que son contrat d'acquisition ne l'y obligedt. C'est une obligation
personnelle d celui qui l'a contractde, et d laquelle l'acqudreur demeure soumis en
vertu de la convention contenue dans son contrat d'acquisiton." The author, how-
ever, revised this view in the third volume of his treatise and concluded that a
real right of enjoyment other than usufruct, use, or habitation may validly be
stipulated in favor of a person. Thus, a right of passage could be stipulated in
favor of a person rather than an estate, and this right would bind all subsequent
acquirers of the property. This right would not be a predial servitude because it
would terminate with the life of the beneficiary. Nor would this be a personal
servitude forbidden by article 686 of the French Civil Code: "This article must
apply," Toullier stated, "to services that are due, not to any person whoever, but
to the owner of an estate as such. For example, the right to silence the frogs
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The expression "personal to the individual" does not neces-
sarily mean that the right created is a personal obligation bind-
ing only the parties to the agreement. It obviously means that
the right is not a predial servitude in favor "of the [dominant]
house or its owner." Thus, it can be a real right,25 a veritable
personal servitude on the servient estate which expires with the
life of the beneficiary in the absence of contrary stipulation.
This interpretation finds support in article 758 which declares
that "when the right is merely personal to the individual, it
expires with him, unless the contrary has been stipulated. ' 26
If the "personal" right were not a personal servitude but a con-
tractual right of enjoyment, there is no reason why it should
terminate with the life of the beneficiary. Personal rights (obli-
gations) are, in principle, heritable.27 It is only personal servi-
tudes, i.e., real rights of enjoyment, that terminate with the life
of the individual beneficiary.28
The question of the frdedom of parties to create personal
servitudes other than usufruct, use, or habitation has been raised
in a number of Louisiana cases. In Louisiana & A.R.R. v. Winn
Parish Lumber Co.,2 9 involving especially the problem of the
validity of a servitude imposing affirmative duties on the owner
of the servient estate, Justice Provosty rendered a monumental
separate opinion in which he discussed at length the nature of
which disturb the sleep of a landowner or of his wife would be a service due to a
person; the right to kiss the bride would be of the same nature. This is an
observation that has escaped my attention in the treatise on servitudes; because
if one were to argue that the Code does not allow a citizen of Rennes to stipulate
for a right of passage, during his life, over an estate so as to shorten the distance
or to go to places not accessible by highway, one would attribute to the Code an
absurd meaning, namely that it prohibits something without reason." 3 TOULLIETI,
DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 401 (1833).
25. See Mallet v. Thibault, 212 La. 79, 31 So. 2d 601 (1947), discussed in
note 44 infra; Simoneaux v. Lebermuth & Israel Planting Co., 155 La. 689, 99
So. 531 (1924), discussed in note 44 infra; Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's
Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1920), discussed text at note 38 infra; Levet v.
Lapeyrollerie, 39 La. Ann. 210, 1 So. 672 (1887), quoted note 36 infra. However,
the question whether a real right has been created or merely an obligation will
be determined in the light of the circumstances and the intention of the parties.
See Martin v. Louisiana Public Utilities Co., 13 La. App. 181, 127 So. 470 (1st
Cir. 1930) (contract of water company to connect plaintiffs property with its
sewer system, held, a lease rather than a servitude).
26. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 758 (1870) ; cf. 2 TOULLIER, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS
167 (1833) : "Ainsi, le mnnim droit concddd peut n'etre qu'une faculd personnelle
4 l'individu, et qui s'eteint 4 sa mort .. "
27. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1999 (1870) : "Every obligation shall be deemed
heritable as to both parties, unless the contrary be specially expressed, or neces-
sarily implied from the nature of the contract"; Currier, Heritability of Con ven-
tlional Obligations, 31 TUL. L. REV. 324 (1957).
28. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 646, 758 (1870).
29. 131 La. 288, 59 So. 403 (1911).
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personal servitudes and the extent of the owner's freedom to
create new kinds of personal servitudes. The Justice pointed out
that while article 646 recognizes personal servitudes "it at the
same time declares that they terminate with the life of the bene-
ficiary, and that 'this kind of servitudes is of three sorts-
usufruct, use and habitation.' Not of four or more sorts, note.
Not whatever unregulated brood of personal servitudes owners
of estates may choose to create; but of three sorts - usufruct,
use, and habitation. '8 0 One should agree with Justice Provosty
that servitudes in faciendo, sometimes referred to as "personal
servitudes" by French writers of the ancien regime, are repro-
bated feudal tenures which have no place under the Louisiana
Civil Code.31 But it is a different question whether the owner
of an estate may or may not create a limited real right of en-
joyment in favor of a person rather than in favor of an estate.
This right of the owner has been recognized in France.3 2 And
both the German3 3 and the Greek34 Civil Codes have introduced
the notion of "limited personal servitudes," i.e., real rights in
favor of a person which confer a limited advantage of use or
enjoyment of a thing belonging to another person.
Since usufruct, a personal servitude exhausting the utility of
a thing, is allowed under the Louisiana Civil Code there is no
valid reason why limited personal servitudes, exhausting only
partially the utility of a thing, should not be allowed.3 5 In no
case, however, should such limited personal servitudes involve
affirmative duties imposed on the owner of the servient estate
or tenures not recognized by Louisiana law. Accordingly, the
content of any predial servitude36 as well as rights to the collec-
30. 59 So. 403, 419 (La. 1911).
31. Indeed, it is only exceptionally that the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870
imposes affirmative duties on the owner of the servient estate. See arts. 663, 671,
691, 712, 773, 775, 815. Cf. 3 ToULLIER, DROIT CIVIL FllANVAIs 401 n. 1 (1833),
quoted note 25 supra.
32. See note 21 supra.
33. See B.G.B. §§ 1090-1093.
34. See GREEK CIVIL CODE arts. 1188-1191.
35. This suggestion does not open the floodgates for the recognition of an
"unregulated brood" of real rights. Limited personal servitudes, as charges on
an estate, should be governed hy the rules of predial servitudes, applied by analogy.
Thus, for example, they ought to confer a determined advantage to the beneficiary
without imposing affirmative duties on the owner of the servient estate. See LA.
CIVIL CODE arts. 654, 655 (1870). On the other hand, as personal servitudes, they
ought to expire with the benefiviary unless the contrary has been stipulated. LA.
CIVIL CODE art. 758 (1870).
36. See Mallet v. Thibault, 212 La. 79, 31 So. 2d 601 (1947) (servitude of
passage in favor of a person rather than an estate) ; Simoncaux v. Lebermuth &
Israel Planting Co., 155 La. 689, 99 So. 531 (1924) (right-of-way for construc-
tion of railroad could be a servitude in favor of a person) ; Levet v. Lapeyrollerie,
39 La. Ann. 210, 214, 1 So. 672, 674 (1887) : "Where a servitude is acquired by
1967]
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tion of fruits37 could be validly stipulated in the form of a per-
sonal servitude burdening an estate in favor of a person rather
than in favor of another estate.
In a landmark decision, Frost-Johnson Co. v. Salling's Heirs,38
the Louisiana Supreme Court declared that personal servitudes
other than usufruct, use, or habitation may be validly created
by the intention of the owner. "The right to establish a servitude
in favor of a person and his heirs," the court reasoned, "seems to
be forbidden by C.C. arts. 646, 709. But, on the other hand, it
seems to be allowed by C.C. arts. 607, 758, 2013. And with these
conflicting provisions before us we cannot say that the law
clearly prohibits the creation of a servitude upon lands in favor
of a person and his heirs. And hence the intention of the par-
ties should govern in such matters. '39 It has been pointed out
elsewhere, however, that the holding of this case may be justi-
fied in the light of pressing social and economic needs 40 so that
the recognition of new kinds of personal servitudes may depend
on a showing of similar needs. Indeed, the freedom of con-
tracting parties to create dismemberments of ownership other
than those regulated in the Civil Code has been sparingly recog-
nized by Louisiana courts ;41 and, outside the fields of mineral
law, 42 building restrictions, 43 and servitudes in favor of public
utilities,44 the courts have only exceptionally given effect to juri-
dical acts creating limited personal servitudes. 45
title, the act stipulating it may validly declare whether it is in favor of the
estate, or only in favor of the landowner, and such stipulation will receive full
effect."
37. See Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Sailing's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207
(1920) (mineral servitude likened to usufruct) ; Peyton v. Hammonds, 125 So. 2d
491 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1960) (legacy of revenues as "kind of usufruct" and a
personal servitude).
38. 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1920).
39. Id. at 864, 91 So. 245.
40. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY §§ 99, 100 (1966).
41. See id. § 96.
42. Id. § § 99-102.
43. Id. § 104.
44. See note 22 supra.
45. See Mallet v. Thibault, 212 La. 79, 31 So. 2d 601 (1947). In this case a
servitude of passage was held to be a personal servitude. "We are not unmindful,"
the court declared, "of Article 709 of the Code which seems to forbid conventional
establishment of a servitude in favor of a person. However, that article cannot
be reconciled with Articles 757 and 758 which are contained in Section 2 of
Chapter 4 of Title IV dealing with the establishment of servitudes and which
provide directly to the contrary. . . . Thus the creation of a personal servitude by
convention will be approved provided, of course, that it does not contravene the
public order." (id. at 89-90, 31 So. 2d at 604). In Simoneaux v. Lebermuth &
Israel Planting Co., 155 La. 689, 694, 99 So. 531, 533 (1924), plaintiff had
granted to defendant a right-of-way over her property for the construction of a
railway needed for transportation of crops to defendant's refinery. Years later
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The following discussion is devoted to the notion, creation,
and function of the right of usufruct, the most important of all
personal servitudes. Use and habitation, along with limited per-
sonal servitudes, will be discussed in another study.
1. NOTION AND KINDS OF USUFRUCT
a. Perfect Usufruct; Definition
Article 533 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 defines usu-
fruct as "the right of enjoying a thing, the property of which is
vested in another, and to draw from the same all the profit,
utility and advantage which it may produce, provided that it
be without altering the substance of the thing."4 6 Substantially
similar definitions are employed in the French,47 German, 4 and
Greek 49 Civil Codes. These definitions apply merely to usufruct
properly so-called (perfect usufruct).
defendant sold both the refinery and the right-of-way to a third person. Plaintiff
sued to annul the grant on the ground that it was a personal servitude in favor of
the defendant which could not be transferred .by sale or otherwise. The court
declared that "The right granted, whether it be considered a real or a personal
servitude, may be sold. . . . If the right granted be considered a personal servi-
tude, we think that its sale is authorized by article 2449 of the Civil Code."
"There is nothing in Article 758," the court went on, "cited by plaintiff, that
provides to the contrary, directly or indirectly. All that the article provides is
that, unless the contrary be expressly stipulated, a servitude personal to the in-
dividual expires with him. If the servitude in contest be considered personal, it
can be so considered only in the sense that it is not predial, or in favor of an
estate. It cannot be considered personal in the sense of being nonheritable or non-
transferable. It is only to personal servitudes that are nonheritable or non-
transferable that article 758 refers." See also Levet v. Lapeyrollerie, 39 La. Ann.
210, 1 So. 672 (1887).
46. LA. CIVL CODE art. 533 (1870) ; La. Civil Code art. 525 (1825). In the
1808 Louisiana Civil Code, p. 110, art. 1, the definition included the words "as
the owner himself could do." These words were struck out on the recommendation
of the redactors of the 1825 Code because "there is a variety of things which
the owner of the thing can do, without altering its substance which are prohibited
to the usufructuary." 1 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES, PROJET OF THE CIVIL CODE
OF 1825, p. 48 (1937).
47. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 578: "Usufruct is the right of enjoying things,
the property of which is vested in another, as could the owner himself, but under
the obligation of preserving its substance."
48. B.G.B. § 1030: "A thing may be burdened with a real right in such a
manner as to confer on the beneficiary of the right the authority to draw all
the profits of the thing (usufruct)." This is obviously a deficient definition.
According to German doctrinal writers (perfect) usufruct is a real right of en-
joyment conferring on the beneficiary the authority to draw all the profits of an
object belonging to another under the obligation of not altering its substance.
49. GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1142: "The personal servitude of usufruct consists
in the real right of the beneficiary to make complete use and to enjoy a thing
belonging to another while the substance of the thing is fully preserved." Cf.
QUEBEC CIVIL CODE art. 443; LAWS OF PUERTO RIco-CIvIL CODE § 1501; SPANISH
CIVIL CODE art. 467; SwIss CIVIL CODE art. 745(2).
50. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 533(2) (1870) ; "The obligation of not altering
the substance of the thing takes place only in the case of perfect usufruct." See
also FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 587; B.G.B. §§ 1037, 1067; GREEK CIVIL CODE
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The definition of usufruct in article 533 of the Louisiana
Civil Code is deficient as it fails to indicate that usufruct is a
real right5' of limited duration. 52 Yet, these are important char-
acteristics of the right of usufruct as they distinguish it from
other rights of enjoyment. Thus, the limited duration of usu-
fruct distinguishes it from rents of lands5 s and from superficiary
rights54 whereas its nature as a real right distinguishes it from
leases55 and obligations having as their object the collection of
fruits or revenues. 56 Accordingly, it is submitted that perfect
usufruct may be defined as a real right of enjoyment of limited
duration which is exercised on a thing belonging to another
under the obligation of preserving the substance of the thing.57
b. Imperfect Usufruct; Definition
Real rights of enjoyment under the obligation of preserving
the substance of the thing may properly be established only on
non-consumable things.58 When the right of enjoyment bears
on consumable things, i.e., things which are extinguished or are
intended to be extinguished by the first use, the obligation of
preserving their substance would contradict the very possibility
of enjoyment: as to such things the jus utendi is meaningless
without the jus abutendi.
art. 1174; text at note 62 infra. The definition of perfect usufruct in the various
civil codes derives from the text of Paul: "usufructus est ius alienis rebus utendi
fruendi salva rerum substantia." D. 7.1.1. For early Roman law, see Buckland,
The Conception of Usufruct in Classical Law, 43 L.Q. REV. 32648 (1927);
Kagan, The Nature of Servitudes and the Association of Usufruct with Them, 22
TUL. L. REV. 94-110 (1947); and, in general, PUGLIESE, USUFRUTTO, USO E
ABITAZIONE 2-18 (1956).
51. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 490(2) (1870): "... any real right towards
a third person; as a usufruct, use or servitude." See also text at note 5 supra.
52. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 606, 612, 646 (1870).
53. See id. art. 2780; YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 94 (1966).
54. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 93 (1966).
55. Id. § 95.
56. Obligations, i.e., personal rights, may indeed have as their object the col-
lection of fruits or revenues. See New Orleans v. Baltimore, 13 La. Ann. 162
(1858) (legacies of revenues, held, personal obligations imposed on the universal
legatees rather than a personal servitude burdening the estate). Frequently, the
question of whether a usufruct has been established or an obligation having as its
object the collection of fruits is a matter of contractual interpretation. See Peyton
v. Hammonds, 125 So. 2d 491, 492 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1960) (legacy of a "usu-
fruct .... on [the testator's] estate to the extent [of] One Hundred Fifty Dollars
per Month." Held, the disposition was a "kind of usufruct," referred to in article
607 of the Civil Code). See also text at notes 199, 200 infra.
57. Cf. 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITA PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 745
(2d ed. Picard 1952).
58. For the notion of consumables and non-consumables, see YIANNOPOULOS,
CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 15 (1966).
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Accordingly, article 534 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 187059
declares that there are two kinds of usufruct: perfect and im-
perfect (or quasi-usufruct). Perfect usufruct is the usufruct of
non-consumable things "which the usufructuary can enjoy with-
out changing their substance, though their substance may be
diminished or deteriorated naturally by time or by the use to
which they are applied; as a house, a piece of land, furniture
and other movable effects."6 0 Imperfect usufruct, on the other
59. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 534 (1870) ; La. Civil Code art. 526 (1825). Cf.
La. Civil Code p. 110, arts. 2-3 (1808). These two articles of the 1808 Code, con-
taining the definitions of perfect and imperfect usufruct and describing the obliga-
tions resulting from each kind of usufruct, were revised by the redactors of the
1825 Code. See 1 LA. LEGAL ARCHIVES, PROJET OF THE CIVIL CODE OF 1825,
pp. 48, 49 (1937) : "We have formed one article, which contains the definition
of perfect and imperfect usufruct, and have inserted in other articles the descrip-
tion of the obligations which result from each kind."
60. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 534(1) (1870). See also id. art. 533(2) : "The obli-
gation of not altering the substance of the thing takes place only in the case of
perfect usufruct." The classification of a thing as consumable or non-consumable
controls the classification 'of usufruct as perfect or imperfect. See Succession of
Franklin, 13 La. App. 289, 127 So. 767 (1930) (jewelry; perfect usufruct).
Shares of stock have been correctly held to be non-consumables, and, therefore,
subject to perfect usufruct. Leury v. Mayer, 122 La. 486, 47 So. 839 (1908);
Succession of Heckert, 160 So. 2d 375 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964). However, when
a corporation is liquidated without any act of the usufructuary, the usufruct
attaches to the proceeds of liquidation and is converted into an imperfect one.
Succession of Dielmann, 119 La. 101, 43 So. 972 (1907). When, on the other
hand, shares of stock are converted into money by the usufructuary, the Louisiana
Supreme Court has declared that the usufruct does not become an imperfect one.
Wainer v. Wainer, 210 La. 324, 26 So. 2d 829 (1946). It is difficult to under-
stand what the court meant by this statement. It ought to be clear that if the
usufructuary alienates things subject to perfect usufruct he violates his obliga-
tion to preserve the substance of the thing. Accordingly, his usufruct may terminate
according to article 621 and, upon termination of the usufruct, the usufructuary
will be "answerable for such losses as proceed from his fraud, default, or neglect"
(art. 567). It is submitted, therefore, that in case the usufructuary sells shares
of stock which later appreciate the measure of the naked owner's recovery ought
to be the value of the stock at the end of the usufruct. Louisiana courts, however,
have allowed recovery of the value of the stock at the time of the creation of the
usufruct or of the sale of the stock. See Succession of Wengert, 180 La. 483, 150
So. 473 (1934) ; Succession of Heckert, 160 So. 2d 375 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
This measure of recovery is prejudicial to the interests of naked owners since they
may thus be deprived of any appreciation of their stock to which they should be
entitled under the law. In Kelley v. Kelley, 185 la. 185, 168 So. 769 (1936), the
court assumed, without deciding, that stocks and bonds were subject to imperfect
usufruct; this assumption ought to be taken with a grain of salt. The court merely
held that stocks and bonds burdened with a usufruct could be garnisheed subject
to the rights of the usufructuary, for debts of the naked owner. In this respect,
the court pointed out, classification of the usufruct as perfect or imperfect would
be immaterial insofar as the interests of the usufructuary were concerned.
The classification of things as consumables or non-consumables is also im-
portant for the determination of the question whether the parties to an agreement
intended to conclude a loan for consumption or a loan for use: consumable things
form the object of a loan for consumption and non-consumable things form the
object of a loan for use. Thus, the loan of banknotes is a loan for consumption.
Egerton v. Buckner, 4 Rob. 346 (La. 1843). On the other hand, the loan of an
automobile or of a prize ox is a loan for use. New York Fire Ins. Co. v. Kansas
Mill Co., 227 La. 976, 81 So. 2d 15 (1955) ; Reehlman v. Calamari, 94 So. 2d 311
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1957).
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hand, is the usufruct of consumables, "which would be useless
to the usufructuary, if he did not consume or expend them, or
change the substance of them, as money, grain, liquors."61 Pro-
visions in the French, German and Greek Civil Codes establish
likewise the notion of usufruct of consumables and regulate its
incidents.62
Imperfect usufruct differs from perfect usufruct in that it
transfers to the usufructuary the ownership of the things sub-
ject to the usufruct and renders the naked owner simple creditor
of the usufructuary. The usufructuary is accorded the right to
"consume, sell or dispose" the things subject to the usufruct
"as he thinks proper"' 3 under the obligation "of returning the
same quantity, quality and value to the owner, or their estimated
price, at the expiration of the usufruct.' '64 Imperfect usufruct
61. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 534(2) (1870). See also id. art. 549: "If the usu-
fruct includes things, which can not be used without being expended or consumed,
or without their substance being changed .. " Louisiana courts have classified
as consumables, and, therefore, as subject to imperfect usufruct money: Mariana
v. Eureka Homestead Soc., 181 La. 125, 158 So. 642 (1935) ; Gryder v. Gryder,
37 La. Ann. 638 (1885) ; Succession of Bickham, 197 So. 924 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1940) ; Dannq, v. Danna, 161 So. 348 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1935) ; Johnson v. Bolt,
146 So. 375 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1933) ; promissory notes: Succession of Block,
137 La. 302, 68 So. 618 (1915) ; Miquez v. Delcambre, 125 La. 176, 51 So. 108
(1910) ; Kahn v. Becnel, 108 La. 296, 32 So. 444 (1902) ; negotiable instruments
to the bearer: Taylor v. Taylor, 189 La. 1084, 181 So. 543 (1938) ; Johnson v.
Bolt, supra; stock of merchandise: Succession of Trouilly, 52 La. Ann. 276, 26
So. 851 (1899) ; Succession of Blanchard, 48 La. Ann. 578, 19 So. 683 (1896) ;
bales of cotton: Succession of Hays, 33 La. Ann. 1143 (1881) ; and certificates of
deposit: Vivian State Bank v. Thomason-Lewis Lumber Co., 162 La. 660, 111
So. 51 (1926). Cf. Comment, Usufruct of a Promissory Note-Perfect or Imper-
fect?, 4 TUL. L. REV. 104 (1930) ; Note, Building and Loan Stock: The Subject
Matter of a Perfect or an Imperfect Usufruct?, 18 LA. L. REV. 335 (1958).
When non-consumables are converted into money as a result of expropriation
or liquidation, the usufruct attaches to the proceeds and becames imperfect. See,
e.g., Burdin v. Burdin, 171 La. 7, 129 So. 651 (1930) ; Succession of Dielmann,
119 La. 101, 43 So. 972 (1907) ; State Through Dept. of Highways v. Costello,
158 So. 2d 850 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963). In this respect, Louisiana courts have
applied the principle of real subrogation. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROP-
ERTY § 79 (1966).
62. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 589; B.G.B. § 1067; GREEK CIVIL CODE art.
1174. The expressions "imperfect" and "quasi usufruct" have been avoided in the
text of the French, German, and Greek Civil Codes. These codes merely regulate
the usufruct of consumables by directly applicable provisions.
63. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 536 (1870); La. Civil Code art. 528 (1825) ; La.
Civil Code pp. 110, 111, art. 3 (1808). See 1 LA. LEOAL ARCHIVES, PROJET OF
THE CIVIL CODE OF 1825, p. 49 (1937): "This article is taken from the third
article of this title, from that part which we there suppressed."
The usufructuary of consumables has power of disposition as a matter of
right. The usufructuary of non-consumables may be granted the same power by
the title creating the usufruct. In such a case, the usufruct attaches to the pro-
ceeds of the sale and is converted from perfect into imperfect. See text at note
221 infra.
64. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 549 (1870) ; La. Civil Code art. 542 (1825) ; La.
Civil Code p. 112, art. 15 (1808). The title creating the usufruct may relieve the
usufructuary of the obligation to account to the naked owner at the end of the
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is rarely established in practice by particular title. More fre-
quently imperfect usufruct is brought about in cases of universal
succession where the estate transferred includes both consum-
able and non-consumable things.
Imperfect usufruct was unknown in early Roman law. Thus,
when a usufruct was established by universal title and the estate
given in usufruct included consumable things, the usufructuary
could take possession of the non-consumables only. 5 In the early
years of the Empire, however, a Senatus Consultum, whose exact
date remains uncertain, provided that testamentary usufruct
could be established on all kinds of things.6 6 It was on the basis
of this legislation that Roman jurists and Romanist scholars in
the following centuries developed the notion and incidents of
imperfect usufruct.
The respective obligations of usufructuaries and naked own-
ers of things subject to imperfect usufruct will be discussed in
another study.
c. Things Susceptible of Usufruct
According to article 541 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 187067
and the corresponding article 581 of the French Civil Code,6 8
usufruct may be established "on every description" of things,6 9
movable and immovable, corporeal and incorporeal. The German
and the Greek Civil Codes provide generally for the creation of
usufruct. See In re Courtin, 144 La. 971, 81 So. 457 (1919), note 221 infra.
In such a case, the "usufructuary" is in reality owner. See also B.G.B. § 1067:
"If object of the usufruct are consumable things, the usufructuary becomes owner
thereof; upon termination of the usufruct, he shall pay to the grantor their value
at the time of the constitution of the usufruct. Both the grantor and the usufruc-
tuary may have the value fixed by experts at their expense"; GREEK CIVIL CODE
art. 1174: "If object of the usufruct is a consumable thing, the usufructuary, in
the absence of contrary provision, becomes owner bf the thing, subject to the
requirement that he must return upon termination of the usufruct, at the choice of
the grantor, either its value at the time of the creation of the usufruct or other
things of the same quantity and quality." See also FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 587
(same as article 549 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870). Cf. ITALIAN CIVIL
CODE art. 995; LAWS OF PUERTO RICO-CIVIL CODE § 1522; SPANISH CIVIL CODE
art. 482; QUEBEC CIVIL CODE art. 452; Swiss CIVIL CODE art. 772.
65. See BUCICLAND, A TExT-BOoK OF ROMAN LAW 271 (2d ed. 1932) ; SOHM-
MITTEIS-WENGER, INSTITUTIONEN 327 (17th ed. 1923).
66. See KAsER, DAS ROMISCHE PRIVATRECHT 380 (1955) ; SCHULZ, CLASSICAL
ROMAN LAW 390 (1951).
67. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 541 (1870) ; La. Civil Code art. 533 (1825)
La. Civil Code p. 110, art. 5 (1808).
68. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 581. See also QUEBEC CIVIL CODE art. 446;
SwIss CIVIL CODE art. 745.
69. For the notion of things, see YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 9
(1966).
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usufruct on "things," i.e., corporeal objects susceptible of ap-
propriation.70  Special provisions in these two Codes, however,
authorize specifically the creation of usufruct on "rights," 71 i.e.,
incorporeal objects in commerce which do not qualify as things,
and regulate the incidents of such a usufruct.72 Usufruct may
thus bear in all jurisdictions on copyrights, claims or credits,
leases, partnerships, business enterprises, and in France even on
another usufruct.73 Generally, any corporeal or incorporeal ob-
ject which is capable of producing an economic advantage may
become the object of usufruct.74
The recognition of usufruct on rights has been said to involve
a doctrinal anomaly. Indeed, under the schemes of the German
and the Greek Civil Codes,75 and according to prevailing doctrine
in France,70 the word ownership in its technical sense applies
to corporeal objects exclusively, and only by recent extension,
to rights of intellectual property. Now the recognition of usu-
fruct on incorporeals involves implicitly the notion that the
"ownership" of an incorporeal may be dismembered whereas,
at the same time, it is being asserted that incorporeals cannot
70. See B.G.B. § 1030; GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1142. For the notion of things
under the German and the Greek Civil Codes, see YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW
PROPERTY §10 (1966).
71. See B.G.B. §§ 1068-1084; GREEK CIVIL CODE arts. 1178-1182.
72. The B.G.B. regulates in detail the usufruct of corporeals ("things"), mov-
ables and immovables (§§ 1030-1067). The same rules apply by analogy to usu-
fructs of rights (§§ 1068-1084) and usufructs of a person's patrimony (§§ 1085-
1089). Similar legislative technique has been followed by the redactors of the
Greek Civil Code. Thus, article 1182 of that Code declares that the rules govern-
ing usufruct of things apply by analogy, in the absence of contrary indication,
to usufructs of rights. Thus, in contrast to predial servitudes and limited personal
servitudes which may burden immovable property only, and as to certain aspects
of use or enjoyment, usufruct under the two Codes confers the right to exhaust
the utility of an object, movable, or immovable, corporeal or incorporeal. For the
notion of object, see YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 10 (1966).
73. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITi PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 755
(2d ed. Picard 1952). In Germany, section 1059 of the B.G.B. provides expressly
that usufruct cannot be established on another usufruct. In Greece, in the
absence of contrary intention, usufruct is non-transferable and, therefore, cannot
be burdened by another usufruct. See GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1166.
74. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIs 755
(2d ed. Picard 1952). In Lasyone v. Emerson, 220 La. 951, 57 So. 2d 906 (1952),
the Louisiana Supreme Court seemed prepared to accept that usufruct may burden
a part of a building belonging in indivision to the naked owner and the usufruc-
tuary! It is submitted that this is contrary to fundamental precepts of Louisiana
civil law. A co-owner may certainly burden his undivided share with usufruct in
favor of a third person. But no one can have a servitude over a thing one owns.
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 619 (1870). Further, co-owners may apportion among them-
selves the use of the thing owned in common; but they cannot establish real rights
of enjoyment, even in favor of third persons, over material parts of the thing they
own by undivided shares.
75. See B.G.B. § 903; GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 999.
76. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAIT PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANUAIS 755
(2d ed. Picard 1952).
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be "owned"! Be it as it may, this doctrinal anomaly does not
involve practical consequences. While the recognition of owner-
ship over incorporeals might solve a number of problems and
might result in more effective protection of these rights, the
usufruct on incorporeals may be regarded as a necessary con-
cession of theory to practical necessity.77 In Louisiana, one fre-
quently speaks of ownership of rights78 and the difficulty is
entirely obviated.
d. Usufruct as an Incorporeal Thing
According to article 537 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870,79
usufruct "is an incorporeal thing because it consists in a right."
The same classification obtains in France, even in the absence
of a corresponding provision in the Code Civil.8 0 In Germany
and Greece usufruct is a right, and, therefore, not a thing.,'
In France and Louisiana usufruct may be either an incor-
poreal movable or an incorporeal immovable, depending on the
nature of the things subject to usufruct. 2 The classification of
rights as movables or immovables has been avoided in both the
German and the Greek Civil Codes.8 3
e. Conventional and Legal Usufruct
Article 540 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 187084 declares
that usufruct "may be established by all sorts of titles; by a deed
77. Cf. BALLS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY 387 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek).
78. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL IAW PROPERTY § 1 (1966).
79. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 537 (1870) ; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 529 (1825) ; LA.
CIVIL CODE (1808) (no corresponding article). See 1 LA. LEGAL ARCHIVES, PROJET
OF THE CIVIL CODE OF 1825, p. 49 (1937), giving as source of this article Digest,
bk. 7, tit. 1, law 2.
80. Cf. 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITIk DE DROIT CIVIL FRAN( AIS 754 (2d ed.
Picard 1952) ; 10 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITI DE LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS 173 (1874-
82).
81. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 10 (1966).
82. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 471 (1870), and corresponding article 526 of the
French Civil Code: "The following are considered as immovable from the object
to which they apply: The usufruct and use of immovable things." Thus, the usu-
fruct of an immovable may be the object of a real mortzage. See LA. CIVIL CODE
art. 3289(2) (1870); FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 2118(2); YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL
LAW PROPERTY § 60 (1966). Cf. Arcadia Bonded Warehouse v. National Union
Fire Ins. Co., 206 La. 681, 19 So. 2d 514 (1944) (insurance of the right to "use
and occupancy" of an immovable was considered insurance of an (incorporeal)
immovable right within the meaning of the regulatory statute, La. Acts 1922,
No. 136) ; Succession of Gamble, 23 La. Ann. 9 (1871) (right to use pews in a
church-an incorporeal immovable).
83. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY §§ 60, 71 (1966).
84. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 540 (1870); LA. CIVIL CODE art. 532 (1825); LA.
CIVIL CODE p. 110, art. 4 (1808).
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of sale, by a marriage contract, by donation, compromise, ex-
change, last will and even by operation of law." Thus usufructs
are distinguished into conventional, created by mortis causa or
inter vivos juridical acts and legal, created by operation of law.
Civil Codes, doctrine, and jurisprudence in other civil law coun-
tries establish the same distinction.85 The methods of creation
and incidents of each kind of usufruct are discussed infra.
f. Universal Usufruct, Usufruct Under Universal Title, and
Usufruct Under Particular Title
According to the Louisiana and French Civil Codes, usufruct
may be universal, under universal title, or under particular
title.8 6 The usufruct of an entire patrimony is universal,8 7 of a
fraction thereof or of a patrimonial mass, under universal title,.8
and of individually determined things, under particular title. 9
The distinction among the three kinds of usufructs involves
practical consequences in the light of the rules governing the
liability of the usufructuary for the payment of debts burdening
the property subject to usufruct. Thus, for example, the usu-
fructuary under particular title is not bound to pay debts, not
even those "for which the estate is mortgaged."00 The universal
usufructuary and the usufructuary under universal title, on the
other hand, may be bound under certain circumstances to con-
tribute to the payment of debts, whether he has acquired the
85. See Yiannopoulos, Legal Usufructs; Louisiana and Comparative Law, to
be published in a forthcomingissue of this Review.
86. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 580-587 (1870) ; FRENCH CIVIL CODE arts. 610-
612.
87. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 585 (1870) : "if the legacy of the usufruct includes
all the property of the testator, and the universal usufructuary . . ." (emphasis
supplied).
88. See id. art. 586: "If, on the contrary, the legacy includes only a certain
portion of the property of the testator, or the whole of a certain kind of property,
the usufructuary under an universal title..." (emphasis supplied).
89. See id. art. 581: "the particular legatee of a usufruct.... ." See also
Cecile v. Lacoste, 8 La. Ann. 142, 144 (1853) (bequest of usufruct over in-
dividually determined things; held, "it is the legacy of a distinct object, and is of
that class called particular legacies"). However, when the testator bequeaths usu-
fruct over individually determined things but the estate consists exclusively of
the property subject to usufruct, the legacy is in reality one by universal title.
Accordingly, the usufructuary incurs the obligations of a universal usufructuary
under articles 584 and 585 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870. See Succession of
Sinnot, 3 La. Ann. 175 (1848) (decided under the corresponding articles 578 and
579 of the 1825 Civil Code). See also 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAIT I PRATIQUE DE
DROIT CIVIL FRANIAIS 757 (2d ed. Picard 1952). Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3556(28)
(1870) : ". . . the buyer, donee or legatee of particular things .... ." For the
notion of patrimony, see YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERIY § 77 (1966).
90. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 581 (1870) ; La. Civil Code art. 575 (1825) ; La.
Civil Code p. 118 art. 36 (1808) ; Cecile v. Lacoste, 8 La. Ann. 142 (1853). Cf.
FRENCH CIVIL C%1DE art. 611.
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usufruct by inter vivos or mortis causa juridical act or by opera-
tion of law.91
Legal usufructs may be either universal or under universal
title whereas conventional usufructs may be universal, under
universal title, or under particular title. The classification of
conventional usufructs in the last analysis depends on the nature
of the things subject to usufruct and on the intention of the
grantor. Since, however, contractual usufructs are rather rare
in practice, courts in Louisiana and in France have dealt almost
exclusively with the classification of testamentary usufructs.
The question of whether the usufruct is universal, under uni-
versal title, or under particular title should not be confused with
the question of whether the usufructuary is universal or par-
ticular successor of the grantor of the usufruct. This last dis-
tinction is likewise important in the light of the rules governing
the responsibility of the acquirer of a right (successor) for the
payment of the debts of the transferor. Thus, article 3556(28)
of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 declares that "successor is,
generally speaking, the person who takes the place of another.
There are in law two sorts of successors: the successor by uni-
versal title, such as the heir, the universal legatee and the legatee
by universal title; and the successor by particular title, such as
the buyer, donee or legatee of particular things, the transferee.
The universal successor represents the person of the deceased,
and succeeds to all his rights and duties. The particular successor
succeeds only to the rights appertaining to the thing which is
sold, ceded or bequeathed to him. ' 92
The usufructuary may be either particular or universal suc-
cessor of the grantor of the usufruct. If the usufruct is estab-
lished by inter vivos juridical act, the usufructuary is always
a particular successor of the grantor, regardless of whether the
usufruct itself is under universal or under particular title . 3 If,
however, the usufruct is established by will, the usufructuary
may be either particular or universal successor of the grantor,
depending on the nature of the legacy. According to the law of
91. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 580, 582, 583 (1870); Succession of Sinnot,
3 La. Ann. 175 (1848). See also note 102 infra.
92. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3556(28) (1870), and, in general for the lia-
bilities of successors, YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 78, text at notes
129-145, §§ 113, 115 (1967).
93. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 582 (1870). For the proposition that inter vivos
transfers of patrimonies are always by particular title, see YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL
LAw PROPERTY § 77, text at note 68 (1967).
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successions, legacies of an entire estate are universal, of a frac-
tion thereof under universal title, and of individually determined
things under particular title.9 4 Universal legatees and legatees
under universal title are universal successors; legatees under
particular title are particular successors.95 These classifications
are also reflected in the articles of the Louisiana and French
Civil Codes dealing with legacies of usufruct.
Doctrine and jurisprudence in France are substantially in
agreement that the legacy of usufruct, even of an entire estate,
can never be a universal legacy. According to most commenta-
tors of past generations the legacy of usufruct is always under
particular title, whether it bears on an entire estate, a fraction
thereof, or on individually determined things.96 Thus, the legatee
of the usufruct is always a particular successor of the grantor.
According to French jurisprudence, however, and modern French
writers, the legacy of usufruct of an entire estate or of a frac-
tion thereof is a legacy under universal title; it is only the legacy
of the usufruct of individually determined things that is a legacy
94. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1606 (1870); FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1003:
"A universal legacy is a testamentary disposition, by which the testator gives to
one or several persons the whole of the property which he leaves at his decease";
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1612 (1870) ; FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1010(1) : "The legacy
under a universal title is that by which a testator bequeaths a certain portion of
the effects of which the law permits him to dispose, as a half, a third, or all
his immovables, or all his movables, or a fixed portion of all his immovables or
all his movables"; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1625 (1870) ; FRENCH CIVIL CODE art.
1010(2) : "Every legacy, not included in the definition before given of universal
legacies and legacies under a universal title, is a legacy under a particular title."
The distinction between the three kinds of legacies involves practical conse-
quences in the light of the rules governing payment of debts, seizin, profit by the
lapse of other legacies, and many other matters. See Comment, Some Problems
in the Classification of Legacies, 3 LA. L. REV. 212-22 (1940).
95. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3556(28) (1870), text at note 92 supra. Cf. id.
arts. 580-587 (1870); FRENCH CIVIL CODE arts. 610-612. See also Comment,
Some Problems in the Classification of Legacies, 3 LA. L. REV. 212, 213-217
(1940).
96. See 11 AURRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIs 444 (5th ed. 1913); 21
DEMOLOMBE, TRAITP DES DONATIONS 510 (5th ed. 1876) ; 13 LAURENT, PRINCIPES
DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 574 (2d ed. 1876). According to these authors, article
612 of the French Civil Code (corresponding to articles 582 and 587 of the Lou-
isiana Civil Code of 1870) does not establish the proposition that the legacy of
usufruct can be universal or by universal title; when it speaks of a "universal
usufructuary" or "usufructuary under a universal title," the article merely refers
to the scope of the usufruct. The contribution to the debts of the estate, provided
for in this article, is not a personal obligation imposed on the usufructuary as
universal legatee or as legatee by universal title but merely a charge on the
revenues produced by the things subject to the usufruct. This view is, indeed,
supported by article 1010 of the French Civil Code (corresponding to article 1625
of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870), which, without mentioning usufruct, declares
that the enumeration of universal legacies or legacies by universal title is limita-
tive. But it does violence to the language of article 612 and leads to unfair solu-
tions.
USUFRUCT: GENERAL PRINCIPLES
under particular title.97 Thus, the universal usufructuary and
the usufructuary under a universal title are universal successors
of the grantor whereas the usufructuary under particular title
is a particular successor.
In contrast to the legacies of usufruct, legacies of naked own-
ership have not given rise to doctrinal disagreements: courts and
commentators are in accord that the legacy of the naked owner-
ship of an entire estate is universal, of a fraction thereof, under
universal title, and of individually determined things, under par-
ticular title.98
In Louisiana, the question whether a universal usufructuary
or a usufructuary under universal title may qualify as a uni-
versal legatee was involved in the Succession of Dougart.9 9 The
court declared in that case that the legacy of usufruct is always
a legacy under particular title. "True, we speak of a universal
usufructuary," the court reasoned, "or of one by universal title,
so does the Code, Art. 580, but this is only a manner of speaking,
and does not constitute the legatee of the usufruct either a uni-
versal legatee, or a legatee by universal title. This is more evi-
dent by the fact that universal legatees, and those by universal
title, are liable for the debts of the succession. C.C. 1611, 1614;
whereas the legatee of the usufruct, however general, is never
liable therefor."'1 It is submitted that this solution is quite
97. See Req., Dec. 27, 1934, D.H. 1935.100, S. 1935.1.256; Req., June 29,
1910, D.1911.1.49, Note by Capitant, S. 1913.1.33, Note by Hugueney; Civ., June
19, 1895, D. 1895.1.470, S. 1895.1.336; Req., Jan. 31, 1893, D. 1893.1.359, S.
1893.1.438; See 11 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAiS 344 n.7, 348 (7th ed.
Esmein 1956); 3 COLIN, CAPITANT, ET JULLIOT DE LA MORANDI]kRE. COURS
AL]kMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 948 (10th ed. 1950) ; 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT,
TRAIT ]LMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL 676 (4th ed. 1951) ; 5 PLANIOL ET RIPERT,
TRAiTit PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 776, 777 (2d ed. Trasbot et Loussouarn
1957). These authors point out that, theoretical difficulties notwithstanding, this
solution is preferable in the light of considerations of practical utility and fair-
ness to all concerned. According to a third view. the legacy of usufruct can be
universal, under universal title, or under particular title, depending on whether
it bears on an entire estate, a portion thereof, or on individually determined
things. See Labbd, J. Pal. 1863.113.
98. See 11 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 344, 347 (7th ed. Esmein
1956) ; 11 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, TRAITIt THORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL
195 (3d ed. Colin 1905) ; 21 DEMOLOMBE, TRAIT DES DONATIONS 472 (5th ed.
1876) ; 13 LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 573 (2d ed. 1876);
5 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITE PRATIQUE Dr DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 775 (2d ed.
Trasbot et Loussouarn 1957). See also Civ., July 12, 1892, D.1892.1.451, S.
1892.1.573; Req., Dec. 3, 1872, D. 1873.1.233, S. 1873.1.73; Angers, March 25,
1895, S.1895.2.270.
99. 30 La. Ann. 268 (1878); SAUNDERS, LECTURES ON THE CIVIL CODE OF
LOUISIANA 329 (1925).
100. Succession of Dougart, 30 La. Ann. 268, 272 (1878). But see Succession
of Sinnot, 3 La. Ann. 175 (1848) (legacy of usufruct over testator's entire prop-
erty is a universal legacy).
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unfortunate because it is liable to lead to unfair results.10' The
legatee of usufruct by universal title and the universal legatee
of the usufruct ought to qualify as universal legatees for pur-
poses other than the payment of the debts of the succession. In-
sofar as the debts are concerned, directly applicable provisions
in the Louisiana Civil Code declare that the legatee of usufruct
is not to be treated as a universal successor; his liability is
limited to contributions in accordance with the detailed ap-
plicable provisions. 102
In the legal systems of Germany and Greece, distinction is
made between usufruct of individual objects 0 3 and usufruct of
an entire patrimony, 04 of a fraction thereof, or of a patrimonial
mass.105 From the viewpoint of functional considerations, it
may be said that the Louisiana and French notions of usufruct
by particular title corresponds to the German and Greek notions
of usufruct of individual objects; conversely, the notions of usu-
fruct by universal title and universal usufruct correspond to the
notions of usufruct of an entire patrimony, a fraction thereof,
or of a patrimonial mass. The German Civil Code contains a
number of provisions governing the usufruct of patrimonies. 0 6
101. Cf. Succession of Sinnot, 3 La. Ann. 175, 177 (1848) (declaring that
the legacy of usufruct over testator's entire property is governed "by the rules
in relation to legatees under an universal title" and that "this construction
appears to us to be reasonable, and consistent with the remaining dispositions
of the Code upon the same subject"; note 97 supra.
102. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 580-587 (1870) ; cf. Succession of Singer, 208
La. 463, 23 So. 2d 184 (1945); Haight v. Johnson, 131 La. 781, 60 So. 248
(1912) ; Long v. Dickerson, 127 La. 341, 53 So. 598 (1910); Succession of
Moore, 42 La. Ann. 332, 7 So. 561 (1890) ; Succession of Pratt, 12 La. Ann. 457
(1857) ; Succession of Bringier, 4 La. Ann. 389 (1849) ; Succession of Fitz-
williams, 3 La. Ann. 489 (1848) ; Succession of Sinnot, 3 La. Ann. 175 (1848).
See also 3 COLIN, CAPITANT ET JULLIOT DE LA MORANDItRE, COURS PLtMENTAIRE
DE DROIT CIVIL 949 n. 1 (10th ed. 1950).
103. See B.G.B. §§ 1030-1067 (usufruct of things) ; §§ 1068-1084 (usufruct of
rights) ; GREEK CIVIL CODE arts. 1142-1176 (usufruct of things) ; arts. 1178-1182
(usufruct of rights). In the absence of contrary provisions, the rules governing
usufruct of things apply by analogy to usufruct of rights. B.G.B. § 1068; GREKac
CIVIL CODE art. 1182. In both Codes, the usufruct of universalities of things
bears on individual things rather than on the whole and is reduced to as many
usufructs as there are things in the universality. This is so because real rights
can" exist only on things; but universalities are not things in these systems. See
YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 18 (1966) ; cf. B.G.B. 1035; GREEK CIVIL
CODE art. 1146.
104. See B.G.B. §§ 1085-1089; GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1156.
105. In the German Civil Code the generic "patrimony" ordinarily includes
fractions thereof and patrimonial masses. In the Greek Civil Code the term in-
cludes patrimonial masses but the redactors of the Code took care in referring to
patrimony to add the clause "or a part thereof." See GREEK CIVIL CODE arts.
367, 1156. For the notion of patrimony and patrimonial masses under the German
and Greek Civil Codes, see YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY §§ 80-83 (1966).
106. See note 104 supra. Further. the German Civil Code provides that the
provisions governing usufruct of patrimonies apply by analogy to usufruct of a
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The Greek Civil Code contains merely Article 1156 which deals
specifically with the liability of the usufructuary for the debts
of the naked owner. I0 7 Under both the German and the Greek
Civil Code, the usufruct of patrimonies is reduced to as many
rights of usufruct as there are individual objects in the patri-
mony. 08 Since patrimonies are not "things" under these codes,
there can be no comprehensive real right of usufruct over the
entire mass. Thus, the provisions of the Civil Codes dealing
with usufruct of things or rights apply by analogy to each in-
dividual object included in the mass, depending on its nature as
corporeal or incorporeal. 0 9
The difference between usufruct of individual objects and
usufruct of patrimonies manifests itself in the rules governing
the liability of the usufructuary for debts of the grantor. Under
both the German and the Greek Civil Code, the usufructuary of
individual things is bound to pay, for the duration of the usu-
fruct, the ordinary public charges and interests on real security
rights burdening the property at the time of the creation of the
usufruct.110 This obligation of the usufructuary is incurred
toward the grantor rather than his creditors who have no direct
action against the usufructuary."' On the contrary, the liability
of the usufructuary of patrimonies is incurred directly toward
creditors and is more extensive than that of the usufructuary
of individual things. Under the German Civil Code, the usu-
fructuary of patrimonies is bound for the payment of periodi-
cally accruing debts as well as for the payment of both capital
and interests on debts existing at the time of the creation of the
usufruct." 2 Under the Greek Civil Code, however, the usufruc-
succession. B.G.B. § 1089. There is no corresponding provision in the Greek
Civil Code because the usufruct of a succession may be subject to different rules.
See text at notes 118-119 infra.
107. Since testamentary usufructs may be subject to different rules, the field
of operation of this article is restricted, in most cases, to contractual usufructs.
See BALIS, CIVIL LAW Pr.OPERTY 362 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek); text at notes
118-119 in fra.
108. See B.G.B. § 1085. The same result follows logically under the Greek
Civil Code even in the absence of a corresponding provision. See BALIS, CIVIL
LAW PROPERTY 343 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek).
109. See WOLFF-RAISER, SACHENRECIHT 489 (1957).
110. B.G.B. § 1047; GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1156.
111. Ibid. See also 26 O.L.G. 93, 94 (K.G. Feb. 9, 1911).
112. See B.G.B. §§ 1086-1088. The grantor remains the principal debtor; the
liability of the usufructuary consists in that he must suffer execution on the
property subject to usufruct for the payment of the debts of the grantor. The
liability of the usufructuary is thus limited; and, in any case, he may free him-
self of any obligation by abandoning the usufruct. See WOLFF-RAISER, SACHEN-
RECUT 491 (10th ed. 1957).
1967]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
tuary of patrimonies is liable only for alimentary obligations
and interests on debts of the owner existing at the time of the
creation of the usufruct."18
As in Louisiana and in France, the usufructuary in Germany
and in Greece may be universal or particular successor of the
grantor of the usufruct. According to the system of the German
Civil Code, the legacy of usufruct is, ordinarily, a charge on the
inheritance of instituted or ab intestat heirs who are bound by
an obligation to establish the usufruct. 1 4 Thus, the legatee of
usufruct is ordinarily a particular successor of the grantor, and,
from the viewpoint of functional considerations, it may be said
that the legacy of usufruct in Germany ordinarily corresponds
to the notion of a particular legacy under the Louisiana and
French Civil Codes. 1 5 Exceptionally, the usufructuary of an
entire succession in Germany may occupy in all respects the
position, rights and duties, of an instituted heir, i.e., he may be
a universal successor. 10I If the usufructuary is a successor by
particular title, as it usually happens, his lia1ilities for the pay-
ment of debts are determined according to whether the usufruct
bears on individual objects or on entire patrimony."1 7
Under the Greek Civil Code, the legacy of usufruct is likewise
a charge on the inheritance of ab intestat heirs but the legatee's
right may vest immediately upon the death of the testator."18
The legatee of the usufruct of an entire estate, of a fraction
thereof, or even of individually determined things may qualify
according to the intention of the testator as an instituted heir,
in which case he is liable along with other heirs for the pay-
ment of the debts of the succession. 119 But, if the intention of
the testator is that the usufructuary be a legatee rather than
heir the liabilities of the usufructuary are determined according
to whether the usufruct is of individual objects or of a patri-
113. See GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1156; BALIS, CIVIL LAM PROPERTY 362 (3d
ed. 1955) (in Greek).
114. See 3 SOERGEL-MtHL, BiRGERLICIIES GESETZBUCH 446 (9th ed. 1960)
5 SOERGEL-EHARD-EDER, BORGERLICIES GESETZBUCH 196 (9th ed. 1961) ; WOLFF-
RAISEr. SACHENRECHT 462, 489 (1957). See also Rheinstein, Niessbrauch, in 5
ItECIITSVERLEICHENDES HANDW6RTERBUCII 431, 434 (1936). The notion of in-
stituted heir under the German Civil Code corresponds to the notion of universal
legatees or legatee by universal title under the French and Louisiana Civil Codes.
115. See text at note 93 supra.
116. See 3 SOEROEL-MttHL, BIRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH 446 (9th ed. 1960) and
cases cited.
117. See B.G.B. § 1089.
118. See GREEK CIVIL CODE arts. 1995, 1996.
119. See BALis, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY 362 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek).
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mony. The usufructuary of an entire succession or of a fraction
thereof is clearly bound as a usufructuary of an entire patri-
mony.
g. Usufruct in Undivided Shares; Partition
According to article 539 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870,
usufruct may be conferred "on several persons, in divided or
undivided portions."' 20 Similar provisions may be found in other
civil codes. 121
When usufruct is conferred in undivided portions the right
of enjoyment is "but one,"1 22 shared among co-usufructuaries in
proportion to their interests. Usufruct, however, is a divisible 23
incorporeal 121 thing and the state of indivision may terminate
at any time upon the demand of any of the co-usufructuaries by
partition in kind or by licitation. 125 Article 538 of the Louisiana
Civil Code of 1870126 seems to indicate that partition in kind is
always possible "because the object of this right is the receiving
the fruits of the thing, which are corporeal and divisible." But
usufruct may well be established on indivisible things or things
which do not produce fruits (e.g., usufruct of jewelry) ; in these
cases partition by licitation is the available remedy. 27
120. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 539 (1870); La. Civil Code art. 531 (1825)
La. Civil Code (1808) (no corresponding article). The redactors of the 1825
Louisiana Civil Code cited as source of this article Digest, bk. 7, tit. 1, law 5.
See 1 LA. LEGAL ARCHIVES, PROJET OF THE CIVIL CODE OF 1825, p. 50 (1937).
1Vhen usufruct is conferred jointly on two or more persons, it is a matter of
contractual or testamentary interpretation to determine whether a right of sur-
vivorship has been granted in favor of the persons named as usufructuaries.
Thus, the usufruct may terminate at different periods as to the several usufruc-
tuaries and the undivided share in usufruct may be united with the naked owner-
ship upon the death of each usufructuary. See Samuels v. Brownlee, 36 La. Ann.
228 (1884). On the other hand, the undivided share of one of the usufructuaries
may, upon his death, inure to the benefit of the remaining usufructuaries. See
Arcenaux v. Bernard, 10 La. 246 (1836).
121. See GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1144; LAWS OF PUERTO RICO-CIVIL CODE
§ 1529; cf. B.G.B. §§ 1060, 1066. Even in the absence of a corresponding provi-
sion in the French Civil Code, no doubt has ever been entertained there that usu-
fruct may be conferred in undividea portions. See 10 DEMIOLOIME, TRAITA DE LA
DISTINCTION DES BIENs 757 (1874-82) ; 3 1'LANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITI PRATIQUE
DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 757 (2d ed. Picard 1952).
122. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 538 (1870) ; La. Civil Code art. 530 (1825) ; La.
Civil Code (1808) (no corresponding article). Source of this article is the Digest,
bk. 7, tit. 1, law 5. See 1 LA. LEGAL ARCHIVES, PROJET OF THE CIVIL CODE OF
1825 p. 50 (1937).
123. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 538 (1870).
124. Id. art. 537; text at note 79 supra.
125. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1309 (1870) : "Usufructuaries of the same estate
can institute among themselves the action of partition." Cf. id. art. 538; and, in
general, Comment, Licitation, 8 TUL. L. REV. 574 (1934).
126. See note 122 supra.
127. For the notion of indivisible things, see YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW
PROPERTY § 17 (1966).
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Likewise, when the naked ownership is held by several per-
sons in undivided shares and the usufruct by another person or
persons, partition of the naked ownership in kind or by licitation
may be demanded by any of the co-owners.128 This partition of
the naked ownership does not affect adversely the interests of
the usufructuaries who continue to enjoy the thing as if no
change of ownership took place. 1 29
Difficulties arise, especially in cases of usufruct established
by universal title, when the same person acquires an undivided
interest in usufruct and an undivided interest in naked owner-
ship; when the sole naked owner has also an undivided interest
in usufruct; or when the sole usufructuary has also an undivided
interest in the naked ownership. Partition merely of the right
of enjoyment or of the naked ownership in kind or by licitation
has long been recognized in France. 130 In Louisiana, courts and
litigants have failed to distinguish clearly between partition of
the elements held in common (right of enjoyment or naked
ownership) and partition of the entire property free of the
usufruct.'3 ' Thus, while no case holds squarely that partition
128. See Smith v. Nelson, 121 La. 170, 174, 46 So. 200, 201 (1908) : "There
is no doubt that, as between those to whom the naked ownership alone is vested,
a partition may be enforced by . . . licitation" ; Succession of Glancy, 108 La. 414,
421, 32 So. 356, 359 (1902) : "We are not aware that this court had ever held
that the fact of the existence of the usufruct, in the surviving partner in com-
munity, would cut off an action of partition by the heirs of the other spouse if
the result of the partition would not be to extinguish the usufructuary's right."
The Civil Code provides that anyone may demand partition of a thing held in
common. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1289 (1870) : "No one can be compelled to hold
property with another, unless the contrary has been agreed upon; any one has
a right to demand the division of a thing held in common, by the action of parti-
tion." See also id. art. 1308: "The action of partition will not only lie between
co-heirs and co-legatees, but between all persons who hold property in common,
from whatever cause they may hold in common."
129. See Kaffie v. Wilson, 130 La. 350, 353, 57 So. 1001, 1002 (1911) (parti-
tion of the naked ownership in kind among co-owners none of whom had a frac-
tional interest in usufruct over the same property). The court stated: "We do
not perceive any legal impediment to a partition in kind, of the naked property,
subject to the rights of enjoyment of the usufructuary. As the naked property may
be mortgaged, sold, or alienated (C.C. art. 605), it may be partitioned in kind,
subject to the usufruct. In such a case the usufructuary has no cause of com-
plaint." It is submitted that the same argument applies to partition of the naked
ownership by licitation, which is a judicial sale authorized by Article 605 of the
Civil Code. Of course, it is a different question when partition by licitation of
the property free of the usufruct is demanded. See text at notes 136-138 infra.
130. See 4 PLANTOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE' DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS
675 (2d ed. Maury et Vialleton 1956) ; 10 AUBY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS
117 (6th ed. Esmein 1954) ; and, in general, Vialleton, Le droit au partage des
usufruitiers et propietaires par indivis, 24 REv. TRIM. DR. Civ. 261 (1925).
131. See, e.g., Kaffie v. Wilson, 130 La. 350, 57 So. 1001 (1911), discussed
note 129 supra. In the course of its opinion, the court distinguished the case of
Succession of Glancey, 112 La. 430, 36 So. 483 (1904), Where partition by licita-
tion was refused. There, the court declared, the usufruct was legal whereas in the
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of the elements held in common cannot be forced between naked
owners or between usufructuaries, it seems to be assumed, on
the authority of cases dealing with the distinguishable situation
of sale of the entire property free of the usufruct, that such par-
tition is excluded. Actually, this assumption rests on dicta in a
leading case which indicate that the naked ownership cannot be
partitioned by licitation if one of the naked owners has also an
undivided interest in usufruct. 132 It is submitted, therefore, that
partition of the common elements is permissible in Louisiana.
In the absence of elements held in common, partition in kind
or by licitation as between naked owners and usufructuaries is
excluded. 13 3 These persons do not hold the same type of interest
by undivided shares, i.e., they do not possess rights of the same
nature over the same object. 13 4 Partition upon demand of the
case under consideration the usufruct was conventional. It is submitted that this
distinction is not well taken. The nature of the usufruct ought to be without
consequence in the matter of partition. The difference between the Kaffie case
and the Glancey case actually lies in the fact that in the latter partition free of
the usufruct was demanded while in the former the demand was .for partition
subject of the existing usufruct.
132. Cf. Smith v. Nelson, 121 La. 170, 46 So. 200 (1908), text at note 139
infra. But see Day v. Collins, 5 La. Ann. 588 (1850) (community partitioned
notwithstanding the existence of survivor's usufruct).
133. Thus, when the same thing is held by several persons as usufructuaries
Smith v. Nelson, 121 La. 170, 46 So. 200 (1890) ; 15 DEMOLOMBE, TEAITt DES
SUCCESSIONS 435 (1874-82). In these cases indivision exists only as to co-
usufructuaries or co-owners. See 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 639
(7th ed. Esmein 1961). Cf. Succession of Glancey, 112 La. 430, 36 So. 483 (1904)
(partition by licitation of property free of the surviving spouse's usufruct of the
whole excluded). The court in reaching this decision relied on the intention of the
legislature to protect the survivor.
Determination of what constitutes holding in common is the essential inquiry
in ascertaining the right to partition. It clearly means more than holding real
rights over the same thing. See Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Reese, 195 La. 359,
196 So. 558 (1940) ; Smith v. Nelson, 121 La. 170, 46 So. 200 (1908). Under the
Louisiana Civil Code and Louisiana jurisprudence, holding in common means hold-
ing the same type of real right over the same object. Thus, perfect owners may
force partition against perfect owners, usufructuaries against usufructuaries, and
naked owners against naked owners.
134. Cf. Buckner-larmon Wood Contractor v. Norris, 231 La. 437, 91 So. 2d
594 (1956), involving the analogous situation of an action for partition of timber-
lands brought by holders of a fractional interest-in timber and in land; held, in
the light of Smith v. Nelson, 121 La. 170, 46 So. 200 (1908), that partition by
licitation is excluded. "Plaintiffs and defendants," the court declared, "are not
owners in common of the same estate which is essential under articles 1289 and
1308 of the Civil Code fot the action of partition. Although plaintiffs undoubtedly
own an undivided estate in timber, separate and apart from the land on which it
stands, they cannot demand a partition from the defendants, who hold a single
estate under article 465 of the Civil Code consisting of an undivided interest in
the land and the growing timber."
Sale of the property free of the usufruct, however, may be accomplished for
the satisfaction of debts burdening the estate of the grantor. LA. CIVIL CODE arts.
584, 585 (1870). In such a case, the right of usufruct attaches to the proceeds
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usufructuary would constitute, in effect, expropriation of the
naked ownership; partition upon demand of the naked owner
would result in termination of the usufruct or in its transfer to
the proceeds of the sale of the property. But when the same
person holds undivided interests in usufruct and in naked owner-
ship, commentators and jurisprudence in France seem to be in
agreement that, if the things are susceptible of partition in kind,
the entire property may be so partitioned. 13 5 As a result of such
a partition, the person holding undivided interests in both usu-
fruct and naked ownership may acquire perfect ownership over
certain individually determined things. The availability of this
proceeding, therefore, tends toward re-integration of ownership.
On the contrary, partition by licitation of the entire property,
i.e., sale free of the usufruct, should be excluded according to
the prevailing doctrine in France even if there are elements
held in common. 36 A number of judicial decisions, however,
stressing the interests of all concerned and particularly the in-
terests of the naked owners, have allowed partition and sale of
the property free of the usufruct. 13 7 Obviously separate sale of
the naked ownership and separate sale of the usufruct would be
less advantageous to the parties; the proceeds of the sale of
perfect ownership may generally be expected to be higher than
the combined proceeds of the separate sales of usufruct and
naked ownership. 138
remaining after the satisfaction of creditors. Succession of Singer, 208 La. 463,
23 So.2d 184 (1945).
135. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAIT4 PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRAN4QAIS
758 (2d ed. Picard 1952).
136. 2 AUnRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 663 n. 11 (5th ed. 1897) ; 15
DEMOLOMBE, TRAITt DES SuccEssIoNs 435 (1874-82); 6 LAURENT, PRINCIPES
DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 466 (2d ed. 1876) ; Beudant, Note, D. 1878.1.145. Sep-
arate sale of the usufruct or of the naked ownership, however, is always permis-
sible. See text at note 130 supra.
137. See, e.g., Req., July 20, 1932, D.P. 1933.1.113, Note by Savatier; Civ.,
August 25, 1879, S. 1880.1.181 ; Civ., June 24, 1863, D.63.1.285; Trib. Civ. Muret,
Dec. 29, 1894, D. 1898.1.164, under Cass., May 12, 1897; Poitiers, Dec. 28, 1887,
D.89.2.113. Cf. Req., Jan. 7, 1878, S.80.1.145, Note by Lnbbd. According to one
view, the proceeds of the sale would be partitioned between naked owners and
usufructuaries, in proportion to the value of their respective interests. See Aix,
Oct. 22, 1929, J.C.P. 1929.2.1389. According to another view, the usufruct should
attach to the proceeds of the sale. See 4 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE
DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 676 (2d ed. Maury et Vialleton 1956) ; Savatier, Note,
29 REV. TRIm. DR. CIv. 164 (1930).
138. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TLIT4 PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS
759 (2d ed. Picard 1952) ; 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 639 (7th ed.
Esmein 1961). Cf. Succession of Glancey, 112 La. 430, 432, 36 So. 483 (1904)
"It is not probable that any one would seek to buy property thus burdened.
One of the coheirs, owning a limited fractional portion, as compared to the
[Vol. XXVII
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In Louisiana, it seems to be assumed that partition by licita-
tion of the entire property (free of the usufruct) is excluded not
only in the absence of elements held in common 13 9 but also when
a person holds an undivided interest in naked ownership and
an undivided interest in usufruct over the same property. In
the leading case of Smith v. Nelson,140 action was brought by
persons holding an undivided one-half interest in naked owner-
ship against the owner of the other half and usufructuary of
the whole for partition by licitation. The demand was predicated
on the mistaken assumption that the usufruct had terminated
and on the assertion that the property was not susceptible of
partition in kind. The court first determined that the usufruct
continued to burden the property and then dismissed the action
on the ground that there was no thing "held in common." The
conclusion was bolstered by reference to article 605 of the Civil
Code, which prohibits interference with the enjoyment of the
usufructuary.
In the light of the facts involved and the nature of the de-
mand, the narrow holding of Smith v. Nelson is that when a
person holds an undivided interest in naked ownership and the
same person is also usufructuary of the whole, partition by sale
of the property free of the usufruct is excluded.' 41 The court, as
it should, left open the question whether partition of the entire
property in kind could be obtained.'4 2 Further, the court did
remainder owned by his coheir, should not have the right to insist upon a sale
and compel a loss to which in all fairness his coheirs should not be subjected."
139. See text at note 133 8upra.
140. 121 La. 170, 46 So. 200 (1908). See also Succession of Glancey, 112
La. 430, 36 So. 483 (1904) (partition by licitation of property free of the sur-
viving spouse's usufruct excluded). Nelson v. Smith was followed in Fricke v.
Stafford, 159 So. 2d 52 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963), noted in 24 LA. L. REV. 885
(1964). In that case, an undivided half interest was held in perfect ownership
by eleven living heirs; one co-heir, defendant, had the usufruct of the other half
undivided interest. All eleven heirs held the naked ownership in indivision. In
an action for partition of the property by licitation, free of the usufruct, the court
held that partition by licitation of the entire complex of rights cannot be forced
by a person who holds shares of undivided perfect and imperfect ownership, if
the property, or an undivided portion thereof, is burdened with a valid usufruct.
141. This holding conforms fully with the precepts of the Civil Code. See text
at note 133 supra. In the case of Baun v. George, 154 La. 680, 98 So. 85 (1923),
the survivor in community, entitled to one-half of the naked ownership and the
usufruct of the remainder, brought action against the remaining naked owners
to partition the property. The court distinguished this case on the ground that
it was the usufructuary who was asking the court to compel the sale of the
entire property to effect a partition. Her demand was made without reservation
of her usufruct and without any claim of usufruct in the proceeds. This proceed-
ing, said the court, was in effect a waiver and a renunciation of her usufruct, in
order that the usufructuary might obtain a partition of the property and that
such a proceeding was permissible and valid.
142. See Smith v. Nelson, 121 La. 170, 171, 46 So. 200, 201 (1908): "We
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not have the opportunity to determine the question whether
partition in kind or by licitation of the element actually held in
common, i.e., of the naked ownership, was permissible. Language
indicated that a naked owner should not be allowed to force a
perfect owner to dismember his title ;143 but the court took care
to indicate that no such demand had been made.
144
While the narrow holding in Smith v. Nelson is thus beyond
reproach, it is submitted that Louisiana courts should follow it
only in similar fact situations and should reconsider the sound-
ness of certain uncalled for judicial declarations of policy made
by way of dicta. It ought to be remembered that partition of
the elements held in common, i.e., of the usufruct or of the naked
ownership, is clearly permissible under the Civil Code. Further,
pragmatic considerations and the French experience point to
the desirability of partition by licitation of the entire property
at the discretion of the court, with the rights of the parties
transferred to the proceeds of the sale. 145
The issue of partition between usufructuaries and naked
owners is also raised when succession property subject to uni-
versal usufruct is sold for the satisfaction of debts burdening
the estate of the grantor. 146 If there is some cash residue, argu-
ment could be made that it should be partitioned among usu-
fructuaries and naked owners in proportion to the value of their
may remark, in conclusion, that, in having been conceded that the property here
in question is not susceptible of division in kind, we have not felt called upon to
express an opinion upon the question whether, if it were divisible in kind, a parti-
tion of the naked ownership might not be enforced, and we do not wish to be
understood as conveying any intimation to the contrary."
143. See id. at 174, 46 So. at 201 : "If it be said that plaintiffs and defendants
are owners in common, of the naked title, and that, the property being indivisible
in kind, plaintiffs have a right to compel the sale of such naked title in order to
effect a partition, the answer is that a sale of that kind would have the effect,
as to the undivided half interest in the property of which defendant has the perfect
ownership, of permanently dismembering his title, so that the naked ownership
would become vested in the purchaser whilst the usufruct would remain in the
defendant." The argument is not well taken because in similar situations the right
of ownership is already dismembered; and the person who holds undivided inter-
ests in both usufruct And naked ownership does not hold any identifiable portion
of the property in perfect ownership.
144. See id. at 175, 46 So. at 201: "The fact is plaintiffs have not prayed for
a sale of the naked ownership, or for a sale of the property subject to the usu-
fruct. .. ."
145. Cf. note 137 8upra.
146. When property subject to usufruct is burdened with debts, the usufruc-
tuary may retain the property, make advances for payment and be reimbursed
without interest upon termination of the usufruct; or he may sell property suf-
ficient to pay the debts, unless the heirs advance money for payment. LA. CIVIL
CODE arts. 584, 585 (1870) ; Succession of Weller, 107 La. 466, 31 So. 883 (1902)
Succession of Bringier, 4 La. Ann. 389 (1849).
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respective interests. 147 According to Louisiana jurisprudence,
however, and the prevailing view in France, the usufruct at-
taches to the cash residue. 4 8
According to the systems of the German and Greek Civil
Codes, the usufruct in undivided shares establishes a community
of interests 49 among co-usufructuaries. The right of enjoyment
may thus be apportioned in kind among co-usufructuaries, in
the sense of attribution to each holder of the right in common
of determined emoluments or advantages of use. 50 But since
usufruct is ordinarily a non-transferable right under these
codes, 51 partition of the right itself in kind or by licitation is
excluded. 152 Moreover, there can be no partition in kind or by
licitation of the entire property upon demand either of the usu-
fructuary or of the naked owner because there is no community
of interests between these persons. 153
Under the German Civil Code, if property held in common is
burdened with a right of usufruct it may be partitioned only
with the concurrence of the naked owners and usufructuaries. 15 4
In such a case, the property is sold free of the usufruct and the
usufructuary has an obligatory claim against the naked owner
whose share was burdened with the usufruct for the establish-
ment of a new usufruct on his share of the proceeds of the sale.155
On the contrary, under the Greek Civil Code, co-owners may
partition among themselves the property held in common in kind
or by licitation but always subject to the rights of the usufruc-
147. Sbe 10 DEMOLOMBE, TRAIT]t DE LA DISTINCTION DES RIENS 174 (1874-82),
and cases cited.
148. See Succession of Singer, 208 La. 463, 23 So. 2d 184 (1945) ; Succession
of Gardona, 14 La. Ann. 356 (1859) ; see also Succession of Russel, 208 La. 213,
23 So. 50 (1945) ; cf. Savatier, Note, 29 REV. TRIM. DR. Civ. 164-166 (1M0).
149. See B.G.B. §§ 741-758; GREEK CIVIL CODE arts. 785-894; 2 SOEIGEL-MfWIL,
BURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH 392, 393, 423 (9th ed. 1960); 2 ZEPos, LAW OF
OBLIGATIONS 658 (2d ed. 1965) (in Greek).
150. See B.G.B. §§ 743, 745; GREEK CIVIL CODE arts. 786, 787, 790.
151. See B.G.B. § 1059. Exceptionally, and by virtue of a 1953 amendment,
usufructs in favor of a juristic person is transferable under certain conditions.
B.G.B. § 1059a. See also GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1166. This article is applicable
only "in the absence of other provision." The parties, therefore, are free to establish
a transferable usufruct in Greece.
152. Sections 746, 747, and 749-751 of the German Civil Code and articles
791, 793, and 795-801 of the Greek Civil Code, dealing with disposition and parti-
tion of interests in the community of ownership are not applicable to usufruct.
3 SOERGEL-MftIIL, BfIRoERLICIES GESETZBUCU 423 (9th ed. 1960).
153. Cf. text at notes 133, 149 supra.
154. B.G.B. § 1066(2).
155. See B.G.B. § 1066(3) ; 3 SOERGEL-MfTIL, BRGERLICHES GESETZBUiCH 434
(9th ed. 1960).
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tuary.15 6 This means, in effect, that when property held in com-
mon is burdened with a usufruct it is only the naked ownership
that can be partitioned without the consent of the usufructuary.
2. CREATION OF USUFRUCT
Article 540 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870,157 and corre-
sponding provisions in the French'5 8 and Greek1 59 Civil Codes,
indicate that usufruct may be created either by inter vivos or
mortis causa juridical act (conventional usufruct) or by opera-
tion of law (legal u~ufruct). Further, the Greek Civil Code pro-
vides expressly for the creation of usufruct by acquisitive pre-
scription. 160 According to the system of the German Civil Code,
however, usufruct may be created directly either by inter vivos
juridical act or by acquisitive prescription. 6 '
Usufructs created by juridical act may be either contractual 0
or testamentary.62 Legal usufructs may be of various kinds.
In Louisiana, the surviving spouse has a legal usufruct on one-
half of the community property inherited by issue of the mar-
riage' 63 and parents have a right of enjoyment over the property
of their minor children.164 In France 65 and Greece,'66 provisions
in the Civil Codes or in special legislation establish likewise
species of legal usufructs. These usufructs may, in some re-
156. See GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 803; BALlS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY 275 (3d ed.
1955) (in Greek).
157. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 540 (1870) : "Usufruct may be established by all
sorts of titles; by a deed of sale, by a marriage contract, by donation, compromise,
exchange, last will and even by operation of law. Thus the usufruct to which a
father is entitled on thb estate of his children during the marriage, is a legal
usufruct." La. Civil Code art. 532 (1825) (same) ; La. Civil Code p. 110, art. 4
(1808) (same).
158. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 579: "Usufruct is established by law or by
the voluntary acts of man." See also QUEBEC CIVIL'CODE art. 444 (same).
159. See GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1143': "Usufruct is established by juridical
act or by acquisitive prescription. The provisions governing acquisitive prescrip-
tion of movables or immovables, and transfer of ownership by agreement, apply by
analogy to the creation of usufruct." See also LAWS OF PUERTO RICO-CIVIL CODE
§ 1520; ITALIAN CIVIL CODE art. 978.
160. See note 159 supra.
161. See B.G.B. §§ 873, 1032, 1033; WOLFF-RAISER, SACHENRECHT 464 (10th
ed. 1957). Cf. text at notes 268-277 infra.
162. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS
760 (2d ed. Picard 1952). In the framework of the German Civil Code, "testa-
mentary" usufructs merely involve an obligation of the heirs to create a usufruct
on the estate of the testator by their own inter vivos juridical act. See text at
note 114 supra.
163. See Yiannopoulos, Legal Usufructs; Louisiana and Comparative Law, to
be published in a forthcoming issue of this Review.
164. See ibid.
165. See ibid.
166. See ibid.
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spects, be subject to special regulation as is, for example, the
right of enjoyment that a husband has over the dotal property
of his wife. 6 7 In Germany, however, rights of enjoyment founded
directly on law are distinguished sharply from usufruct and are
regarded as substantially different institutions.
1 68
a. Creation of Usufruct by Juridical Act
i. Contractual Usufruct. Contractual usufruct may be created
by means of any contract translative of ownership, as sale, ex-
change, or donation. 169 It may also be created by voluntary parti-
tion. 17° The owner may reserve the usufruct and transfer the
naked ownership to another person, reserve the naked owner-
ship and transfer the usufruct, or he may alienate the thing
completely by transferring the usufruct to one person and the
naked ownership to another.' By way of exception, however,
article 1533 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 provides that
the donor of immovable property cannot reserve the usufruct
for himself. 72 This article was given its present formulation
in the 1825 revision. The redactors, following the Custom of
Orleans, declared that "the reservation of the usufruct in favor
of the donee [sic] would produce the disadvantage of concealing
from the eyes of the public the change of property which has
taken place. He who wishes to enjoy during his life a piece of
property which he destines for another, can give it by last will,
and is not easy to perceive the use of a donation inter vivos,
with reserve of usufruct.""'1  It is submitted that this reasoning
167. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITIS PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS
760 (2d ed. Picard 1952) ; cf. Wimbish v. Gray, 10 Rob. 46 (La. 1845).
168. Apt German terminology thus distinguishes between Nutzniessung (legal
rights of enjoyment) and Niessbrauch (usufruct). See WOLFF-RAISER, SACHEN-
RECHT 462 (10th ed. 1957) ; 2 Orro GIERTE, DEUTSCHES PRIVATRECHT 680 (1905).
169. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 540 (1870); FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 579;
B.G.B. §§ 873, 1032; GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1143.
170. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITIt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS
761 (2d ed. Picard 1952).
171. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2012 (1870) : "Real obligations may be created
in three ways: ... 2. By alienating to one person the immovable property, and
to another, some real right to be exercised upon it. . . .The right of use and
habitation and usufruct, are examples. . ."; Gibson v. Zylks, 186 La. 1043, 173
So. 757 (1937) (sale with reservation of usufruct).172. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1533 (1870) : "The donor is permitted to dis-
pose, for the advantage of any other person, of the enjoyment or usufruct of
the immovable property given, but he can not reserve it for himself."; La. Civil
Code art. 1520 (1825) ; Creech v. Errington, 207 La. 615, 21 So. 2d 761 (1945).
But see La. Civil Code p. 220, art. 50 (1808) same as art. 949 of the French
Civil Code: "The donor is permitted to reserve for his own advantage, or to
dispose of for the advantage of any other person, the enjoyment or usufruct of
the immovable property given."
173. See COUTUME D'ORLtANS, art. 284; 1 LA. LEGAL ARCHIVES, PROJET OF
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misses the essential point that wills are freely revocable while
inter vivos donations are revocable only for enumerated rea-
sons. 74 Accordingly, the availability of an inter vivos donation
of property with reservation of usufruct in other civil law sys-
tems favors substantially the position of the beneficiary. Article
1533 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 does not prohibit the
reservation of usufruct where movable property is donated and
the implication is that this is permitted. 17  However, argument
has been made that the contrary implication ought to be drawn
in the light of the history and the policy underlying this article. 176
Creation of contractual usufruct by sale, or onerous title in
general, is rarely encountered in practice. 77 Price is an essential
prerequisite for the validity of a sale; yet, the price of usufruct
is not easy to determine since the duration of the right depends
on the life of the usufructuary. This difficulty is obviated in
gratuitous juridical acts which, for this reason, are more preva-
lent.
In all legal systems under consideration, the creation of usu-
fruct by contract is subject to the rules governing transfer of
ownership as to both requirements of form and substance. Thus,
THE CIVIL CODE OF 1825, p. 209 (1937). It would seem that this reasoning ap-
plies with even greater force to the donation of movables with reservation of
usufruct. Yet, the proposed article 1520 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825
mentions only "immovable property"!
174. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1559, 1690 (1870).
175. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 560 (1870): "Neither the father nor mother,
having the legal usufruct of the estate of their children, nor the seller, nor the
donor, under the reservation of the usufruct, is required to give security" (emphasis
added); id. art. 1500: "The value in full ownership of property which has been
alienated, either for an annuity for life, or with reservation of a usufruct .. "
These provisions were applicable, under the regime of the 1808 Code, to donations
of both movables and immovables with reservation of usufruct. Today, in the light
of prohibition of article 1533 of the 1870 Code, they may apply to donations of
movables only.
176. See Comment, Reservation of Usufruct on Donation of Movables, 4 TUL.
L. REV. 419 (1930). Art. 50, bk. III, of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808 fol-
lowed literally the text of article 949 of the French Civil Code, with the omission
of the words "or movable." This might be taken as an indication of the intention
of the redactors of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808 to disallow the reservation
of usufruct in donations of movables. But this indication is weak and is coun-
tered by the provisions of the preceding article 49 of the 1808 Code, repeating
the text of article 950 of the French Civil Code, which regulated the obligations
of the donor of movables who had reserved the usufruct.
177. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITi PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS
761 (2d ed. Picard 1952) ; WOLFF-RAISER, SACHENRECHT 461 (10th ed. 1957) ;
BALIS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY 343 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek). Cf. SAUNDERS,
LECTURES ON THE CIVIL CODE OF LOUISIANA 169 (1952) : "This subject is not
of a great deal of practical importance. You might infer this by looking at your
Merrick's Code; you will see there very few references to cases on the subject of
usufruct .. "
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inter vivos donations of usufruct must be dressed in the appro-
priate forms in order to be valid even between the parties to
the transaction. 7  Specifically, articles 1536 and 1538 of the
Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 require the authentic form for the
validity of inter vivos donations of both corporeal and incorporeal
movables and immovables. The exception as to manual gifts of
corporeal movables, established in article 1539 of the same Code,
does not apply to donations of usufruct because usufruct is an
incorporeal.
Agreements establishing usufruct of immovables by onerous
title may be made under private signature in Louisiana. 170 Such
agreements ought to be valid between the parties even if not
reduced to writing; but, in this case, they might only be proved
under the terms of article 2275 of the Louisiana Civil Code of
1870 which declares that "if a verbal sale of such [immovable]
property, be made, it shall be good against the vendor, as well
as against the vendee, who confesses it when interrogated on
oath, provided that actual delivery has been made of the im-
movable property thus sold." This article, which has no equiva-
lent in the Civil Codes of France, Germany, or Greece, has been
apparently disregarded in a number of Louisiana cases. Instead,
Louisiana courts, relying on procedural rules of evidence, have
uniformly required written instruments for the proof, even be-
tween the parties, of onerous agreements creating usufruct over
immovables.'5 0 In France, instruments under private signature
are sufficient for the creation of usufruct by onerous title inso-
far as the parties to the transaction are concerned.1 8' In Ger-
many, usufruct by onerous title may be created over immovables
178. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1536, 1538 (1870) ; FRENCH CIVIL CODE arts.
931, 948; B.G.B. § 518 (promises of donations) ; GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 498.
For Louisiana jurisprudence, see Bailey v. Ward, 32 La. Ann. 839 (1880) ; Lee
v. Cummings, 27 La. Ann. 529 (.1875) ; Lynch v. Lynch, 23 La. Ann. 242 (1871)
(parol evidence inadmissible to prove inter vivos donations of usufruct over im-
movables).
179. See LA. CIvIr CODE art. 2240 (1870).
180. See Guier v. Guier, 7 La. Ann. 103 (1852); Newman v. Gumina, 77
So. 2d 899 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1955) (oral testimony to prove usufruct over
immovable property inadmissible) ; cf. Louis v. Garrison, 64 So. 2d 254 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1953) (habitation; requirement of written instrument satisfied).
The cases cited are based exclusively on procedural objections relating to the
inadm-ssibility of oral testimony. The substantive question of the validity of a
usufruct created by oral agreement was not at issue. Thus, one might speculate
as to whether the courts would give substantive effect to admissions by the alleged
naked owner tending to show an oral agreement for the creation of usufruct. It
would seem that in these circumstances article 2275 should apply.
181. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITIt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS
633 (2d ed. Picard 1952). As to requisites for the validity and effect of conven-
tional usufructs against third persons, see note 184 infra.
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by informal agreement but the agreement must be inscribed in
the land register.18 2 And in Greece, usufructs over immovables
require for their creation agreement dressed in the notarial form
and inscription in the public records.'"
In France and in Louisiana, contractual usufructs affecting
immovables, whether by gratuitous or by onerous title, need
be recorded in order to be effective against third persons. 8 4 In
Germany inscription in the land register, and in Greece inscrip-
tion in the public records, is an essential prerequisite for the
very creation of the real right of enjoyment over immovables.
Prior to inscription or recordation there is no usufruct in the
two countries but merely a personal obligation of the grantor to
create the usufruct.
Inter vivos donations of the usufruct of movables, clothed in
the appropriate form, are valid between the parties as well as
against third persons in Louisiana and in France without de-
livery of the movables to the usufructuary.5 5 Onerous agree-
ments for the creation of usufruct over movables are likewise
valid between the parties as well as against third persons in
182. See B.G.B. § 873; 3 SOERGEL-BAUR, BGRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH 54-61
(9th ed. 1960).
183. See GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1143, referring by implication to arts. 1033,
1192, and 1198 of the same Code; BALIS, CIVIL LAW PROPEITY 344 (3d ed. 1955)
(in Greek).
184. France: see Law of March 23, 1855, art. 1; Decree of Jan. 4, 1955; 2
AURRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRAINAIS 395, 642 (7th ed. Esmein 1961); 3
PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 762 (2d ed.
Picard 1952). Further, it ought to be noted that according to article 4 of the
Decree of Jan. 4, 1955, all acts subject to recordation need be dressed in the
authentic form. Thus, the creation of usufruct over immovables in France,
whether by gratuitous or by onerous title, in order to be effective against third
persons, must be reduced in the notarial form and inscribed in the public records.
It is equally clear in Louisiana that contractual usufructs affecting immov-
ables, whether by onerous or gratuitous title, in order to be effective against
third persons, must be recorded. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2266(1) (1870) : "All
sales, contracts and judgments affecting immovable property, which shall not be
so recorded, shall be utterly null and void, except between the parties thereto.
The recording may be made at any time, but shall only affect third persons from
the time of the recording"; LA. R.S. 9:2721 (1950): "No sale, contract. . . or
other instrument of writing relating to or affecting immovable property shall be
binding on or affect third persons or third parties unless and until filed for
registry .... Of. Blevins v. Manufacturers Record Publishing Co., 235 La. 708,
771, 105 So. 2d 392, 414 (1958) : "[A] third party purchaser may rely upon the
conveyance records-and is not bound or barred ,by unrecorded claims against the
property purchased, even though he has actual notice thereof from outside the
records"; MeDuffie v. Walker, 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100 (1910) (unrecorded acts
affecting immovables cannot be asserted against third persons) ; Jackson v. Colson,
91 So. 2d 394 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956) (third persons dealing with immovables
have the right to depend on public records).
185. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 938; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1550 (1870):
"A donation, duly accepted, is perfected by the mere consent of the parties; and
(Vol. XXVII
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France merely by the effect of the consent and without de-
livery ;186 in Louisiana, however, such agreements become effec-
tive against third persons upon delivery of the movables.1 7 In
Germany and in Greece, all usufructs of corporeal movables are
validly constituted by agreement and delivery of the movables
to the usufructuary. Delivery of the corporeal movables, corre-
sponding to the requirements of inscription or recordation for
immovables, is essential for the creation of the real right itself. 88
the ownership of the objects given is transferred to the donee, without the neces-
sity of any other delivery." See also 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DF
DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 629 (2d ed. Picard 1952) ; 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL
FRANCAIS 620, 642 (7th ed. Esmein 1961).
It ought to 'be noted that, with respect to inter vivos donations of movables,
the donee, by an act clothed in the appropriate form, acquires ownership without
delivery in so far as both the donor and third parties are concerned. Article 1550
of the Louisiana Civil Code is not subject to an exception corresponding to that
established in article 1922 of the same Code (note 187 infra). Article 1922,
establishing a general rule for obligations to give, is subject to the exception
established for donations. In other words, article 1922 applies to onerous trans-
actions exclusively. Indeed, the requirement of authentic act for the validity of
donations of corporeal movables not given manually (text at note 178 supra) is
an adequate substitute for delivery. Delivery serves notice to the world that the
ownership of movables has been transferred and tends to prevent fraudulent
claims. Authentic acts, subject to publicity, obviously tend to perform the same
functions. Cf. Harper v. Pierce, 15 La. Ann. 666 (1860) (donation of a slave
valid against third persons without delivery).
186. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1138; cf. Civ., June 24, 1845, D. 1845.1.309,
S. 1846.1.551; 3 PLANIOL ET RI PERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS
630 (2d ed. Picard 1952). However, delivery of possession to the usufructuary
may be essential for his protection against claims by third persons since the
grantor may, under the terms of articles 1141 and 2279 of the French Civil Code,
transfer ownership free of charges to bona fide purchasers.
187. In Louisiana, as in France, obligations to give, arising from acts trans-
lative of title, result in transfer of ownership merely by operation of consent. See
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1909 (1870), corresponding to article 1138 of the French
Civil Code. However, article 1922(1) of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, which
has no equivalent in the French Civil Code, provides that "with respect to movable
effects, although, by the rule referred to in the two last preceding articles, the
consent to transfer vests the ownership of the property in the obligee, yet this
effect is strictly confined to the parties until actual delivery of the object."
Accordingly, Louisiana courts have rightly insisted that transfers of movables by
onerous title are effective against third persons from the time of delivery.. See
Nicolopouloc v. His Creditors, 37 La. Aiin. 472 (Orl. Cir. 1885) ; Nanson and Co.
v. Matthews, 24 La. Ann. 90 (Orl. Cir. 1872) ; Comment, "Traditio" in the Civil
Law, 22 LA. L. REV. 418, 429 (1962) ; Note, 30 TUL. L. REV. 153, 155 (1955).
188. See B.G.B. § 1032; GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1143. Actual delivery of the
movables may be substituted by brevi manu traditio and other forms of fictitious
delivery. See B.G.B. § 1032(2) making applicable by analogy §§ 929(2), 930,
and 933-936 of the same Code; GREEK CIVIL CODE arts. 976-978, 1034-1035.
Further, usufruct over corporeal movables may be established in Germany and in
Greece by the effect of the principle of real subrogation. Thus, when the usu-
fructuary of a claim receives payment of the thing due, his usufruct of a right
is converted by operation of law into a usufruct of a thing. See B.G.B. § 1075;
GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1179. It ought to be noted that usufruct over movables
may be created in Germany and in Greece by a non-owner. For example, a person
taking possession of a thing as usufructuary from a non-owner may acquire usu-
fruct by acquisitive prescription. See WOLFF-RAISER, SACHENRECHT 473 (10th
ed. 1957).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVII
ii. Testamentary Usufruct. In all civil law systems under
consideration, testamentary usufruct is the most prevalent form
of conventional usufruct. The testator may leave the naked own-
ership to his heirs and the usufruct to a designated legatee or
he may leave the naked ownership to a legatee and the usufruct
to his heirs.5 9 The bequest of usufruct provides resources for
the legatee for life without depriving the heirs definitively of
their interest in the succession. Obviously, the same result may
be accomplished by the bequest of an, annuity for life.1'0 Each
of the two methods of securing funds for the legatee has its
advantages and its disadvantages.
Testamentary usufructs are created directly by the effect of
wills in both France and Louisiana. 191 However, since the legacy
of usufruct may be either by universal title or by particular
title,192 the usufructuary legatee has no seizin and must demand
the delivery of the legacy from the heirs, universal legatees,
legatees by universal title, or the executors of the will.19 3 In
Germany, it is only exceptionally that the legatee of the usufruct
of an entire estate may qualify as heir; almost always, therefore,
the legacy of usufruct establishes merely the obligation of in-
stituted or ab intestat heirs to create the usufruct.194 But in
189. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1522 (1870) ;text at note 171 supra; Succession
of Quinlan, 118 La. 602, 43 So. 249 (1907). When the testator leaves his prop-
erty to a named person as usufructuary without disposing of the naked owner-
ship, the naked ownership vests in the legal heirs of the testator. See Fontenot v.
Vidrine, 218 La. 979, 51 So. 2d 597 (1951).
190. See New Orleans v. Baltimore, 13 La. Ann. 162 (1858). Cf. text at
notes 199-202 infra.
191. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 579; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 540 (1870).
192. See text at notes 96, 99 supra.
193. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1011; LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1613, 1630
(1870) ; Succession of Piffet, 39 La. Ann. 466, 1 So. 889 (1887) (particular
legacy of usufruct; usufructuary put in possession by the executors of the will).
It is only universal legatees who have seizin, in the absence of forced heirs. LA.
CIVIL CODE art. 1609 (1870) ; FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1004. Seizin, according
to the better view, should not be confused with possession. Thus, the legatees by
universal or by particular title continue the possession of the testator but have
no seizin. See 4 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITP PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS
321 (2d ed. Maury et Vialleton 1956).
194. See text at note 114 supra, and in general, Erdmann, Der Niessbrauch in
Verfigungea von Todes ivegen nach gemeinem Recht und dem Bilrgerlichen
Gesetzbuch, 94 ARCHIV FOR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS 284-304 (1903). It ought
to be noted, however, that testamentary usufructs in favor of the surviving spouse
(which, in the past, were prevalent) are uncommon in Germany today. Instead
of creating a usufruct in favor of the survivor, the testator may institute the
spouse as a fideicommissary heir (vorerbe) and his children as substitutes
(Nacherben). See B.G.B. §§ 2100-2146. The spouse acquires the ownership of
the estate with power of disposition, subject only to certain limitations. This is
a flexible institution better conforming to the needs of everyday life than usufruct
which does not allow disposition of the assets (dispotionsniesabrauch). For de-
tails, see LANGE, LEHRBUCH DES ERDRECHTS 245-248 (1962). Taxation has exer-
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Greece, the legatee of usufruct may quite regularly be an insti-
tuted heir, and, in any case, even the particular legatee of usu-
fruct may acquire the right directly, upon the death of the
testator.9 5
The creation of usufruct by will is, in general, subject to the
rules governing mortis causa dispositions as to both form and
substance. Further, with the exception of Louisiana, wills creat-
ing usufruct on immovable property must be recorded. 196
iii. Contractual and Testamentary Interpretation. Testators
and parties to contracts do not always take care to designate by
its proper name the type of right they intend to create. Thus,
whenever descriptive language is used, questions arise as to
whether a usufruct or another right of enjoyment has been in-
tended. Further, in mortis causa dispositions, questions arise
as to whether a permissible disposition of usufruct and naked
ownership has been intended or a reprobated substitution.
These are matters of testamentary or of contractual inter-
pretation governed by the general rules of construction of juri-
dical acts. In general, "precise, technical terms are not neces-
sary to create a usufruct. 197 The testator or the parties to the
contract may even use common law terminology to describe the
function of the right of usufruct they intend to create and still
validly establish a usufruct under the civil law.5 5
cised some influence in that development. See 3, 2 STAUDINGER-SPRENG, KOMMEN-
TAR ZUM B.G.B. 1089 (11th ed. 1963).
195. See text at notes 118-119 supra.
196. France: Decree-Law of October 30, 1935; Decree-Law of Jan. 4, 1955;
2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 643 (7th ed. Esmein 1961) ; Germany:
B.G.B. § 873; Greece: GREEK CIVIL CODE at. 1193. In Louisiana, it is the
judgment of possession rather than the will that must be recorded in order to have
effect against third persons. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 2951, 3061
(1960) ; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2266 (1870).
197. Haggard' v. Rushing, 76 So. 2d 52 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954) (quitclaim
deed authorized defendant "to use, without cost, the surface of the south 840
feet" of plaintiff's property ; held, the instrument created a usufruct) ; Greech v.
Errington, 207 La. 615, 21 So. 2d 761 (1945) (provision that donor of property
should "have and control said property during his lifetime, collecting and dis-
bursing all income. . . as may seem just and right to him"; held, donor reserved
usufruct) ; King v. King, 155 La. 19, 98 So. 742 (1924) (provision that named
beneficiary should "receive all the rents, benefits, and emoluments" of property;
held, testator intended to create usufruct). On the other hand, use of the word
"usufruct" may not be determinative in the presence of dispositions irreconcilable
with the notion of usufruct. See Succession of Ward, 110 La. 75, 34 So. 135
(1903). But cf. Giroir v. Dumesnil, 172 So. 2d 89 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965) ; note
221 infra.
198. In Gibson v. Zylks, 186 La. 1043, 1047, 173 So. 757, 758 (1937),
a contract styled as "deed" contained the following language: "In making
this deed to Sam G. Zylks it is understood and mutually agreed that the said
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Legacies of revenues or fruits frequently give rise to the
question of whether a usufruct was intended by the testator or
merely a personal right of enjoyment. In Peyton v. Hammonds,'99
the court held that a legacy of revenues was a "kind of usu-
fruct," namely a real right of enjoyment. The court relied on
article 607 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 which provides
that "the legacy made to any one of the revenues of a property
is a kind of usufruct, which also ceases and becomes extinguished
by the death of the legatee, if the contrary has not been expressly
stipulated. It is the same with all annual legacies as pensions
of alimony and the like." 2°° It is submitted that article 607 does
not intend to make the legacy of revenues or of fruits a real
right; it merely states that it is a "kind of usufruct" in the
sense that it terminates upon the death of the beneficiary unless
the contrary is expressed. 20 1 This possibility of extension of
Mrs. M. M. Zylks is to have the revenue from this property for her support as
long as she lives and to own it as her home uutill [sic] death and then this deed
to operate as a complete transfer of said property to the said Sam G. Zylks and
it is agreed that if the same Sam G. Zylks should die first then in that event the
property shall still be used to support the said Mrs. M. M. Zylks and the family
of the said Sam G. Zylks and at the death of said Mrs. M. M. Zylks then to
revirt [sic] to the heirs of said Sam G. Zylks." When the instrument was at-
tacked by the vendor's children on the grounds that it was an attempt to dispose
of a succession not yet devolved, to make a disposition mortis causa by deed, and
to establish a fideicommissum, the court held that it merely was a sale with
reservation of usufruct for life in favor of the vendor.
199. 125 So. 2d 491, 492 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1960) (legacy "of a usufruct...
on [the testator's] estate to the extent [of] One Hundred Fifty Dollars per
Month." Held, the disposition was a legacy of revenues, a "kind of usufruct").
200. The interpretation given by the court to article 607 conflicts with article
646 of the Louisiana Civil Code which limits personal servitudes to usufruct, use,
and habitation. Cf. text at notes 18, 19 supra. It has been suggested, of course,
that a limited usufruct or a limited personal servitude for the collection of fruits
may be considered as authorized by the Louisiana Civil Code. See text at notes
25-28 supra. But if a limited real right of enjoyment bearing on fruits or revenues
may be established, it must be a direct charge on specified things. Thus, if A
bequeaths to B the fruits or revenues of his estate or of a part thereof, this is a
usufruct; if he bequeaths certain portions of the fruits or revenues of specified
property, this may be regarded as a limited usufruct. But where fruits or revenues
are bequeathed to derive out of an unliquidated estate or from unspecified property
this is not a real right. It is a debt of the succession to be discharged periodically
by the heirs or universal legatees.
A limited usufruct bearing on a portion of fruits of specified things might,
perhaps, qualify as a right of use. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 634 (1870). Use
differs from usufruct in that it involves only partial enjoyment of a thing. The
beneficiary of the right is merely entitled to "exact such portion of the fruit
[the thing] produces, as is necessary for his personal wants and those of his
family." Id. art. 626. It is doubtful, however, whether the right of the beneficiary
may so be varied as to entitle him to fruits in excess of those needed for "his
personal wants and those of his family." See text at notes 18-24 supra. Indeed,
it might be argued that this would be a right other than use. See LA. CIVIL CODE
art. 631 (1870).
201. This interpretation of article 607 was followed in the early cases of New
Orleans v. Baltimore, 13 La. Ann. 162, 163 (1858), decided under the correspond-
ing article 602 of the 1825 Louisiana Civil Code. The court declared that "the
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the life of the right beyond the life of the beneficiary is men-
tioned precisely because the right deriving from a legacy of.
revenues is obligatory in nature.
20 2
The question whether a will establishes a usufruct rather
than a prohibited substitution has been an "ever recurring prob-
lem" 203 in Louisiana. The courts have basically ascribed to the
theory that the intention of the testator controls in this matter.
If by looking to the language of the will, the court arrives at the
conclusion that the testator intended to vest title in a first donee
for life and on the first donee's death to be transmitted to a
second donee, the disposition is a prohibited substitution which
must fall.2 4  If, on the other hand, the court finds that the
testator intends to give the usufruct to one person and the naked
ownership to another, with both interests vesting on the death
of the testator, the disposition is valid.20 5
The application of these tests has proven difficult in practice
and has left almost every testamentary disposition open to litiga-
intention [of the legislature] was, not to make such bequests as these 'annuities'
usufructs in reality, for there is no transfer of possession to the usufructuary, but
that by Article 607 the extreme limit to the bequest before us is thirty years."
See also Succession of Ward, 110 La. 75, 34 So. 135 (1903) : "A person to whom,
out of the revenues of an estate, a certain amount is to be paid monthly, is not a
usufructuary" (syllabus by the court).
202. See Note, 35 TUL. L. R v. 845, 848 (1961).
203. Succession of Johnson, 223 La. 1058, 67 So. 2d 591 (1953). See also
Comment, Testamentary Substitutions and Conditions, 1 LOYOLA L. REv. 207,
211-13 (1941).
204. See Succession of Thilborger, 234 La. 810, 813, 101 So. 2d 678, 679
(1958) : "The simplest test of the substitution prohibited by our law is that it
vests the property in one person at the death of the donor and at the death of
such person vests the same property in another person, who takes the same
directly from the testator but by a title which springs into existence only on the
death of the first donee." See also Succession of Rougon, 223 La. 103, 65 So. 2d
104 (1953) (prohibited substitation) ; Succession of Williams, 169 La. 696, 125
So. 858 (1930), note 207 infra; Succession of Ward, 110 La. 75, 34 So. 135
(1903) ; Marshall v. Pearce, 34 La. Ann. 557 (1882).
Occasionally, wills that might be attacked on the ground that the testator
intended to create a prohibited substitution are merely submitted to the court for
construction and determination of the question whether the legatee is to take
the usufruct or the perfect ownership of the property. See Succession of Heft,
163 La. 467, 112 So. 301 (1927) (perfect ownership) ; Succession of Verneuille,
120 La. 605, 45 So. 520 (1908) (usufruct) ; Succession of Weller, 107 La. 466,
31 So. 883 (1902) (usufruct).
205. Sec Succession of Thilborger, 234 La. 810, 101 So. 2d 678 (1958) ; Suc-
cession of Johnson, 223 La. 1058, 67 So. 2d 591 (1953) ; Girven v. Miller, 219 La.
252, 52 So. 2d 843 (1951) ; Succession of Fertel, 208 La. 614, 23 So. 2d 234
(1945) ; Succession of Blossom, 194 La. 635, 194 So. 572 (1940) ; Succession of
McDuffie, 139 La. 910, 72 So. 450 (1916), Note, 2 So. L.Q. 72 (1917) ; Rice
v. Kay, 138 La. 483, 70 So. 483 (1916) ; Succession of Reilly, 136 La. 347, 67
So. 27 (1915) ; Succession of Good, 45 La. Ann. 1392, 14 So. 252 (1893) ; Succes-
sion of Law, 31 La. Ann. 456 (1879) ; Cecile v. Lacoste, 8 La. Ann. 142 (1853)
Roy v. Latiolas, 5 La. Ann. 552 (1850).
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tion. Further, in interpreting specific language in wills, the
attitude of the Louisiana Supreme Court has fluctuated from a
strict construction of the terms employed to a liberal view giving
effect to dispositions (as conferring usufruct and naked owner-
ship) in the presence of an almost clear intention to create a
prohibited substitution. 206 The problem is still "perplexing, and
it is difficult to reconcile or distinguish" 20 7 apparently conflict-
ing judicial determinations. It has been suggested that the in-
tention theory should be abandoned and the general policy of
declaring a will valid whenever possible be adopted.20  Courts,
however, are not at liberty to disregard terms used in a testa-
ment.20 9 An acceptable solution is to give effect to wills "in-
volving a gift of the property to one for life with a limitation
over to another on his death . . . as a gift of usufruct to one
and naked ownership to another unless the testator expressly
outlines the details of a prohibited substitution by forbidding
the second donee from selling his interest before it vests in pos-
session and by stating that the heirs of the second donee shall
206. In Roy v. Latiolas, 5 La. Ann. 552 (1850), the court sustained a bequest
for life as a donation of the usufruct. But the case was overruled in Marshall v.
Pearce, 34 La. Ann. 557 (1882). In.Succession of McDuffie, 139 La. 910, 72 So.
450 (1916), the court reverted to the rule of Roy v. Latiolas. But again, in the
Succession of Ledbetter, 147 La. 771, 85 So. 908 (1920), involving the validity
of a conditional gift, the court reinstated by way of dictum the rule of Marshall v.
Pearce. This dictum resulted, in the Succession of Williams, 169 La. 696, 698,
125 So. 858, 859 (1930), to the annulment of a disposition which should be inter-
preted as establishing a usufruct rather than a prohibited substitution. The will
provided that property was given to the testator's wife "for her use and bene-
fit . . . for the period of her natural life and at her death everything shall belong
to [the testator's] niece." The court held that the bequest was a prohibited sub-
stitution. "It is clear," the court stated, "that the intention of the testator was
to convey the title of the property as well as the usufruct, to his wife for the
term of her natural life, and that it was only 'at the death' of his wife that the
ownership should vest in the legatee." The decision has been criticized. See
Nabors, An Analysis of the Substitution-Usufruct Problem Under Articles 1520 and
1522 of the Louisiana Civil Code, 4 TUL. L. REV. 603, 605 (1930). Finally, the
VVilliams case has been found "difficult to reconcile or distinguish" from the
Succession of Fertel, 208 La. 614, 23 So. 2d 234 (1945). See Succession of
Thilborger, 234 La. 810, 101 So. 2d 678, 680 (1958).
207. Succession of Johnson, 223 La. 1058, 1063, 67 So. 2d 591, 593 (1953).
208. Cf. LA. CIVIL CoDE art. 1712 (1870) : "A disposition must be understood
in the sense in which it can have effect, rather than that in which it can have
none"; Succession of Thilborger, 234 La. 810, 101 So. 2d 678, 682 (1958), con-
curring opinion by Justice Fournet.
209. See dissenting opinion of Justice O'Niell in Succession of McDuffie, 139
La. 910, 912, 72 So. 450, 452 (1916) : "If we were at liberty to disregard the
terms used in a testament, to carry out the presumed intention of the testator,
every disposition that has been declared null as a prohibited substitution should
have been maintained as a donation of the usufruct of the property to one person
and the ownership to another. I have not yet observed, and cannot imagine, a
case in which a prohibited substitution should be decreed null, if we apply the
doctrine 'that a bequest of property for life is a donation of the usufruct.' "
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not inherit if the second donee should die before the first
donee."2 10
Article 4, section 16, of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921
and article 1520 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 were
amended in 1962 to permit substitutions in trust 211 to the extent
allowed by legislation.212 In the future, therefore, Louisiana
courts construing testaments will have to determine whether
the testator intended to create a substitution in trust, a for-
bidden substitution out of trusts, or a usufruct and naked owner-
ship complex.
iv. Freedom of the Will. According to article 542, first
clause, of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870,213 and corresponding
provisions, jurisprudence, or doctrine in other civil law juris-
dictions, 214 usufruct may be established simply or under condi-
tion or term. But the Louisiana Civil Code declares further that
usufruct may be established "under all such modifications as the
person who gives such a right may be pleased to annex to it. ' '21 5
This broad freedom of will is not recognized in Germany or
Greece ;210 nor is there a corresponding provision in the French
210. Nabors, An Analysis of the Substitution-Usufruct Problem Under Articles
1520 and 1522 of the Louisiana Ciil Code, 4 TUL. L. REV. 603, 607 (1930). Cf.
11 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 183 (6th ed. Esmein 1956).
211. See LA. CONST. art. 4 § 16, as amended, La. Acts 1962, No. 521 (adopted
Nov. 6, 1962) ; LA. CIVIL COE art. 1520 (1870) : "Substitutions are and remain
prohibited, except as permitted by the laws relating to trusts.
"Every disposition not in trust by which the donee, the heir, or legatee is
charged to preserve for and to return a thing to a third person is null, even with
regard to the donee, the instituted heir or the legatee" (as amended by La. Acts
1962, No. 45, § 1).
212. See La. Trust Estates Code, La. Acts 1964, No. 338, now LA. R.S. 9:1721-
2252 (1965).
213. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 542 (1870) ; La. Civil Code art. 534 (1825);
La. Civil Code p. 112, art. 6 (1808).
214. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 580; QUEBEC CIVIL CODE art. 445; cf. 1, 1
ENNECCERus-NIPPEIDEY, ALLOEMEINER TEIL DES BOEGERLICHEN RECHTS 1192
(15th ed. 1960) ; Gieseke, Belastung, in 2 RECHTSVERGLEICIIENDES HANDWIRTER-
SucH 426 (1929) ; GREEIc CIVIL CODE arts. 206, 239; BALIS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY
7 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek).
215. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 542, second clause (1870); id. art. 569(3)
"It is understood that all these restrictions on the rights of the usufructuary, and
others mentioned in this title of the Code, only take place, where there is no
provision to the contrary in the act establishing the usufruct;" id. art. 2013:
"The real obligation, created by condition annexed to the alienation of real prop-
erty, is susceptible of all modifications that the will of the parties can suggest,
except such as are forbidden by law. These conditions are either conditions
precedent, which suspend the operation of the contract until they are performed,
or subsequent and resolutory, which, unless they are performed, annul the con-
tract .. "
216. See WOLFF-RAISER, SACHENRECHT 9 (10th ed. 1957) ; BALIS, CIVIL LAW
PROPERTY 5 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek). Under both the German and Greek Civil
Codes freedom of will (autonomy) has limited functions in the field of property
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Civil Code.217 And even in Louisiana, freedom of the will ob-
tains (in spite of the declaration in article 542 of the Civil Code)
only as to modifications which do not contravene public policy
or mandatory provisions of the Civil Code dealing with real
rights in general or usufruct in particular.218 Thus, for example,
usufruct may not be created for a period exceeding the lifetime
of the usufructuary 219 or for more than thirty years in favor of
a juridical person.220 But it may well be confined to certain desig-
nated advantages of use and enjoyment 22 ' and be declared non-
transferable222 or exempt from seizure; and in France, a con-
law. Thus, the person creating a usufruct may not confine the right of enjoyment
to enumerated advantages. However, he may exclude certain advantages from the
comprehensive right of usufruct. See B.G.B. § 1030(2) ; O.L.G. Oct. 23, 1902,
6 O.L.G. 121; BALis, op. cit supra at 339. Further, the grantor may accord to
the usufructuary, by independent juridical act, the right to alienate things subject
to perfect usufruct. See 3 SOERGEL-MCIHL, BRGOERLICHES GESETZBUCH 395, 424
(9th ed. 1960). And, in Greece, non-consumables may be the object of an im-
perfect usufruct in accordance with the intention of the parties. See BALIS,
op. cit. supra at 385. For similar solutions reached by Louisiana courts, see
note 221 infra.
217. See 3 PLANIOL ET RipERT, TRAITA PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS
763 (2d ed. Picard 1952). Article 580 of the French Civil Code differs from
article 542 of the Louisiana Civil Code by the omission in the former of the
clause "in a word, under all such modifications as the person who gives such
right may be pleased to annex to it."
218. Cf. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 96 (1966); text at notes
18-21 supra.
219. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 606 (1870) ; FRENCH CIVIL CODE 617; B.G.B.
§ 1061. But see GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1167, allowing freedom for contrary
stipulation.
220. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 612 (1870); FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 619;
LAws op PUR ro RICO-CIvIL CODE § 1573; QUEBEC CIVIL CODE art. 481. It was
thought by the redactors of these codes that since the dissolution of a juridical
person is a rare occurrence, an arbitrary limit (corresponding roughly to the life
expectancy of a natural person at the time the civil codes were enacted) should
be set for the dismemberment of ownership into right of enjoyment and naked
ownership. In modern codes, however, usufruct in favor of a juridical person
may be constituted for an unlimited period of time. See B.G.B. § 1061; GREc
CIVIL CODE art. 1167. Obligatory rights of enjoyment in favor of juridical persons
may, of course, exceed the thirty year limit in France and Louisiana. Thus, a
legacy in favor of a juridical person for the annual payment of a sum of money
may be constituted for a period in excess of thirty years. See 3 PLANIOL ET
RIPERT, TRAITE PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 764 (2d ed. Picard 1952).
But see New Orleans v. Baltimore, 13 La. Ann. 162 (1858), note 201 supra.
221. See Gibson v. Zylks, 186 La. 1043, 173 So. 757 (1937). Cf. note 216
supra. The grantor may validly relieve the usufructuary of the obligation to pre-
serve the substance of a thing subject to perfect usufruct; for example, the
grantor may confer on the usufructuary authority to sell the thing. In such a
case, the perfect usufruct may be converted at the option of the usufructuary
into imperfect, with the usufructuary's right of enjoyment attaching to the pro-
ceeds of the sale. See Heirs of Mitchel v. Knox, 34 La. Ann. 399 (1882). The
grantor may also relieve the usufructuary of things subject to imperfect usufruct
of the obligation to account for their value to the naked owner. See In re Courtin,
144 La. 971, 81 So. 457 (1919). But he cannot deprive the usufructuary of the
management of the fund. See Succession of Ward, 110 La. 75, 34 So. 135 (1903).
222. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 555 (1870); FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 595;
GREEx CIVIL CODE art. 1166. On the contrary, usufruct in favor of individuals is
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tractual usufruct may be subject to the administration of a
person other than the usufructuary. 223
Question has been posed as to whether or not usufruct may
be stipulated for a term in Louisiana.2 24 In France, article 617
of the Civil Code provides for the termination of the usufruct
"by the expiration of the time for which it has been granted"
and no one has ever doubted the validity of a usufruct granted
for a term. 225 Nor is any doubt justified under the regime of
the Louisiana Civil Code, even in the absence of an article corre-
sponding exactly to article 617 of the French Civil Code. Indeed,
any doubt is dispelled in the light of article 608 of the Louisiana
Civil Code of 1870.220 Moreover, the need for specific statutory
authorization of usufruct for a term in Louisiana is obviated
by the provision of article 542 of the Civil Code which has no
equivalent in the French Code.2 27
v. Successive Usufructs. It is generally accepted in France
that usufruct may be created in favor of successive benefici-
aries.228 This is not considered as a prohibited substitution be-
non-transferable under the German Civil Code and stipulations to the contrary
are ineffective. See B.G.B. § 1059.
223. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 763
(2d ed. Picard 1952). In the past, usufruct without power of administration was
forbidden in Louisiana. Cf. Succession of Stephens, 45 La. Ann. 962, 13 So. 197
(1893). Today, such a stipulation might be considered valid only if construed
as placing the usufruct in trust in accordance with the applicable legislation.
224. See Comment, Can a Usufruct Be Stipulated for a Term?, 5 LA. L. REV.
609-16 (1944).
225. Article 580 of the French Civil Code, authorizing the creation of usufruct
"at a certain date" (4 certain jour) has been interpreted in France to authorize
usufruct for a term. Accordingly, these words ought to read in English "up to a
certain date." In the French text of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825, the language
of article 534 is identical with that of the French Code. But in the English trans-
lation of the 1825 Code, and the corresponding text of article 542 of the 1870
Code, the words "d certain jour" have been translated as "at a certain day"
rather than "up to a certain date."
226. See LA. CIVIL CoDE art. 608 (1870): "If the title of the usufruct has
limited the right to it to commence or determine at a certain time, or in the event
of a certain conditon, the right does not commence or determine till the condi-
tion happens or the time elapses." The French text of the Louisiana Civil Code
of 1825, article 603, corresponding to article 608 of the 1870 Code, reads: "Si le
titre de l'usufruitier en borne le droit pour commencer et finir 4 un certain temps,
ou d l'vdnement d'une certain condition, le droit ne commencera ou ne cessera
que lorsque la condition sera arriv e, ou le temps expire."
227. See text at note 215 supra. The provision of article 617 of the French
Civil Code is perhaps a necessary clarification in the absence of a provision
corresponding to article 542, second clause, of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870.
228. See Req., Nov. 13, 1918, D.1921.1.119; Bordeaux, June 16, 1863, D.63.2.109,
8.63.2.263; Rennes, May 19, 1863, S.63.2.263; Req., March 23, 1859, D.59.1.508;
3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 763 (2d ed.
Pizard 1952). In Germany, successive usufructs might be considered as prohibited
in the light of the principle of non-transferability of usufructs. Cf. B.G.B. § 1059.
And in Italy, successive usufructs are expressly forbidden, although substitutions
are valid within certain limitations. See ITALIAN CIVIL CODE art. 698.
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cause usufruct terminates necessarily upon the death of the first
usufructuary. The new beneficiary of the right thus takes di-
rectly from the original owner. This analysis of the nature of
successive usufructs poses a limitation: in the case of a con-
tractual successive usufruct each beneficiary must exist or at
least be conceived at the time of the creation of the usufruct;
and in the case of a testamentary successive usufruct each bene-
ficiary must exist or at least be conceived at the time of the
testator's death.2 29
In Louisiana, it might be argued that successive usufructs
fall within the sweeping prohibition against substitutions 30
which, indeed, has no equivalent in the French, German, or
Greek Civil Codes. 23 1 But there is sufficient statutory basis to
sustain the creation of successive usufructs in Louisiana. The
Civil Code affirms expressly the validity of a testamentary usu-
fruct to one legatee and the naked ownership to another.23 2 The
divisibility of usufruct is recognized, 23 3 and successive usufructs
are permitted by almost clear implication. 234 As in France, how-
ever, a usufruct created in favor of a certain person and his heirs
would be null and void. 23 5
vi. Vahe of Usufruct; Fiscal Legislation. Computation of
the value of usufruct may be an important matter in a variety
of contexts. The question, however, arises most frequently in the
framework of fiscal legislation as a result of levies on values
transferred or acquired by inter vivos or mortis causa juridical
acts.
229. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1482 (1870); FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 906; 2
AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 641 (7th ed. Esmein 1961).
230. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1520 (1870), as amended by La. Acts 1962,
No. 45.
231. Article 896 of the French Civil Code, containing a general prohibition
against substitutions, is largely modified by Articles 1048-1074 which allow certain
substitutions. In most civil codes a limited number of fideicommissary substitu-
tions is permitted. See B.G.B. §§ 2100-2146; GRRFXC CIVIL CODE arts. 1166,
1923-1941; 'ITALIAN CIVIL CODE arts. 688-699; SPANISH CIVIL CODE art. 774.
232. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1522 (1870).
233. Id. art. 538. This article may be construed to mean that the grantor is
authorized to create one usufruct and divide it between the donees.
234. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 609 (1870): ."If the usufructuary is charged
to restore the usufruct to another person, his right to the usufruct expires when-
ever the time for making such restitution arrives." A successive usufruct was
actually established under the facts of Fricke v. Stafford, 159 So. 2d 52 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1963). The testator left to his daughter "a life usufruct of all property
real, personal and mixed of which I may die possessed, subject only to the usu-
fructuary claim of my wife should she survive me as fixed by law in her favor."
235. See note 219 supra.
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Fiscal laws vary widely in the legal systems under considera-
tion and it would be outside the scope of the present study to
attempt an exhaustive treatment of matters of taxation. In gen-
eral, two approaches are followed: usufruct and naked owner-
ship are either assessed separately or the property subject to
usufruct is assessed for taxes without regard to outstanding
rights of enjoyment. In the last case, a question arises as to the
apportionment of charges between the naked owner and the
usufructuary.
In France, the acquisitions of usufruct and of naked owner-
ship are assessed separately. The value of the naked ownership
is that of perfect ownership after deduction of the value of the
usufruct. The value of the usufruct is appraised in the light of
the age of the usufructuary and the value of perfect ownership.
If the usufructuary is less than twenty years old, the usufruct
is seven-tenths the value of the property. The value of the usu-
fruct is decreased by one-tenth for every ten years of the age
of the usufructuary and at age seventy it becomes only one-tenth
of the value of perfect ownership. If the usufruct is created for
a term, its value is two-tenths of the perfect ownership for every
ten years of duration without regard to the age of the usufruc-
tuary. 36 According to the jurisprudence, however, this last rule
does not apply where it would result in attributing to a usufruct
of fixed duration a value greater than that of usufruct for life.237
In Louisiana, questions of taxation arise under both federal
and state laws.238 Under federal law, the conveyance of usufruct
or of naked ownership of immovable property by inter vivos
transactions is subject to tax.23 9 Further, transfer of property
236. See Law of Feb. 25, 1901, art. 13; 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE
DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 765 (2d ed. Picard 1952).
237. See Civ., March 20, 1922, D.H. 1924.62, S.1923.1.371; Civ., May 21,
1924, D.1926.1.28.
238. See in general, Greco, Valuation of Naked Ownerships, Usufructs and
Annuities Under Louisiana Inheritance Tax Laws, 10 LA. B.J. 119-44 (1962);
Hickey, The Usufruct and Taxation, 8 LA. B.J. 223-26 (1961) ; Lapeyre, Income
Tax Problems Caused by the Usufructuary's Handling of Properties, 10 TUL. TAX
INST. 399-408 (1961) ; Wisdom and Pigman, Testamentary Dispositions in Lou-
isiana Estate Planning, 26 TUL. L. REV. 119, 128-30 (1952) ; Rubin & Champagne,
Some Community Property Aspects of the 1948 RePvenue Act, 9 LA. L. REV. 1-17
(1948); Comment, The Louisiana Gift Tax, 25 TUL. L. REV. 370 (1951).
239. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2501, as amended Sept. 14, 1960 (1965 Supp.)
"For the calendar year 1955 and each calendar year thereafter, a tax, computed
as provided in section 2502, is hereby imposed on the transfer of property by
gift during such calendar year by any individual, resident or non-resident, except
transfers of intangible property by a non-resident not a citizen of the United States
and who was not engaged in business in the United States during such calendar
year"; id., § 4361, as amended June 21, 1965 (1965 Supp.) : "There is hereby
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upon death is subject to the federal estate tax, to the extent of
the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death. 240
The estate tax is to be paid by the executor or administrator
out of the entire estate241 but the tax collector may proceed di-
rectly against any transferee. 242 The extent of the deceased's
interest in property is a matter determined under state laws.243
Likewise, the distribution of the residue and the ultimate impact
of federal estate taxes on the heirs or legatees are matters gov-
erned by state laws.244
In the absence of directly applicable statutory provisions deal-
ing with the apportionment of federal estate taxes, Louisiana
courts resorted in the past to "equitable principles under Article
21 of the Civil Code. ' 245 Accordingly, the burden of federal taxes
was apportioned among usufructuaries and naked owners as well
as other persons "sharing in the estate in accordance with their
respective interests. '246 Today, under the Louisiana Estate Tax
Apportionment Act of 1960,247 the usufructuary is expressly re-
imposed, on each deed, instrument, or writing by which any lands, tenements, or
other realty sold shall be granted, assigned, transferred or otherwise conveyed to,
or vested in, the purchaser or purchasers or any other person or persons, by his
or their direction, when the consideration or value of the interest or property
conveyed (exclusive of the value of any lien or encumbrance remaining thereon
at the time of sale) exceeds $100, a tax at the rate of 55 cents for each $500
or fractional part thereof. The tax imposed by this section shall not apply on or
after Jan. 1, 1968." Thus, computation of the value of usufruct will always
be an issue in transfers of usufruct or of the naked ownership of immovable
property. For computation of the value of usufruct, and the applicable life
expectancy tables, see Fed. Treas. Dep't, Regs. 25.2512-5(c) (1965).
240. See id. §2031, as amended Oct. 16, 1962 (1965 Supp.). See also id.
§§ 2033 (transactions in contemplation of death); 2035 (transfers taking effect
at death) ; and 2038 (revocable transfers) ; New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256
U.S. 345 (1921).
241. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2002. See also Succession of Ratcliff,
212 La. 563, 571, 33 So. 2d 114, 117 (1947) : "[T]here is but one estate for fed-
eral taxation purposes and the tax is levied on the whole."
242. See Fetting v. Flanigan, 185 Md. 499, 45 A.2d 355 (1946).
243. See Aldrich v. United States, 346 F.2d 37 (5th Cir. 1965). According to
Louisiana jurisprudence, the surviving spouse receiving 1/2 of the community in
usufruct is entitled to deduct, for state inheritance tax purposes, the value of
the usufruct from the gross estate. See text at note 260 infra. Thus, argument
might be made that the deceased did not have a property interest under state
law to the extent of the value of usufruct. But, be it as it may, the question of
what interests are subject to federal tax is a federal question decided according
to federal law. And, according to section 2056(b) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, the usufruct of the surviving spouse, whether testamentary or legal, is
not a deductible item from the adjusted gross estate. Cf. Rubin & Champagne,
Some Community Aspects of the 1948 Revenue Act, 9 LA. L. RzV. 1-17 (1948)
Liebman v. Fontenot, 275 Fed. 688 (W.D. La. 1921).
244. See Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 (1942); Succession of Jarreau,
184 So. 2d 762 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966); Hersor v. Mills, 221 F. Supp. 714
(D.C.D.C. 1963) ; Liebman v. Fontenot, 275 Fed. 688 (W.D. La. 1921).
245. Succession of Ratcliff, 212 La. 563, 33 So. 2d 114, 116 n. 2 (1947).
246. Id. at 570, 33 So. 2d at 117.
247. See La. Acts 1960, No. 362, now LA. R.S. 9:2431-2438 (1965 Supp.).
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lieved of the burden of apportionment. The federal estate tax
as well as the Louisiana estate transfer tax248 is to be paid out
of the entire estate and property subject to usufruct may be sold,
in the absence of agreement between interested parties, for the
satisfaction of the tax burden. The usufruct thus attaches to
the "balance of the property remaining after the sale or the
balance of the proceeds of the sale not necessary for the payment
of the tax.'249
Louisiana has a gift tax applicable to inter vivos donations, 25 0
an inheritance tax251 imposed on all inheritances, legacies, and
donations made in contemplation of death unless specifically
exempted, and an estate transfer tax252 the function of which is
to obtain for the state the full benefit of the 80 per cent credit
allowed by the United States on the federal estate tax.2 3 The
burden of the gift tax is placed on both the donor and the
donee,254 of the inheritance tax on each individual donee, heir,
or legatee for the amount due on his particular inheritance or
legacy,255 and of the estate transfer tax on the estate as a
whole.25
6
248. See text at note 251 infra. The Estate Tax Apportionment Act regulates
apportionment of the federal estate tax and of the Louisiana estate transfer tax
exclusively, in the absence of contrary testamentary disposition. See Succession
of Jarreau, 184 So. 2d 762 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966). The tax liability under the
Louisiana inheritance tax is imposed directly on the recipient of values, and
problems of apportionment do not arise. See LA. R.S. 9:2431(7) (Supp. 1965).
The testator, however, may provide for payment of the inheritance taxes out of
the residuary estate. Succession of Jarreau, 184 So. 2d 762 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1966).
249. LA. R.S. 9:2433 (1965 Supp.).
250. See La. Acts 1940, No. 149, now LA. R.S. 47:1201-1212 (1950) ; Dakin,
Louisiana Tax Legislation of 1940, 3 LA. L. REV. 55 (1940). This tax may be
applicable only (1) to inter vivos donations of usufruct to one person and naked
ownership to another and (2) donations of usufruct with reservation of naked
ownership. Inter vivos donations of the naked ownership of immovables, and per-
haps of movables, with reservation of usufruct are forbidden by Article 1533 of
the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870. See text at note 173 supra.
251. See La. Acts 1921, No. 127, now LA. R.S. 47:2401 (1950). Exemptions
are listed in id. 47:2402. See also Comment, The Louisiana Inheritance and Estate
Taxes, 22 TUL. L. REv. 635 (1948).
252. See La. Acts 1932, No. 119, now LA. R.S. 47:2431-2435 (1950) ; Willis
v. Flournoy, 231 La. 264, 91 So. 2d 33 (1957).
253. The Louisiana estate transfer tax is operative only when the inheritance
tax does not absorb the entire 80 per cent credit allowed by the United States
(see LA. R.S. 47:2432 (1950) ; INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2011(d)), and cannot
exceed that amount. Since the federal estate tax provides for an exemption of
$60,000, successions of less than $60,000 are subject only to the Louisiana in-
heritance tax.
254. See LA. R.S. 47:1209 (1950).
255. See La. Acts 1921, No. 127, now LA. R.S. 47:2401 (1950); Succession
of Cotton, 172 La. 819, 135 So. 368 (1931) ; Succession of Jones, 172 So. 2d 312
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
256. See text at note 248 aupra; Hickey, The Usufruct and Taxation, 8 LA.
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Under this fiscal legislation, the acquisition of usufruct or
of naked ownership by inter vivos donation is subject to the gift
tax and by donation mortis causa subject to the inheritance
tax.257 The value of naked ownership is determined by multiply-
ing the actual cash value of the property at the time of death
by the value of one dollar discounted at six per cent per annum
for a number of years equal to the life expectancy of the usu-
fructuary. 2 8 The value of the usufruct is determined by sub-
tracting from the actual cash value of the property at the time
of death the present value of the naked ownership. 259
The usufruct of the surviving spouse under article 916 of the
Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 escapes the state inheritance tax.
According to well-settled Louisiana jurisprudence, this usufruct
is created by operation of law as an incident of the marriage
contract rather than by "inheritance. ' ' 260 This is so even if the
legal usufruct is "confirmed" by testament. 261 And according to
B.J. 223, 224 (1961). According to the Louisiana Estate Tax Apportionment
Act of 1960, the burden of federal estate taxes and Louisiana estate transfer taxes
is chargeable against the naked ownership without apportionment. See note 247
supra.
257. See Succession of Baker, 129 La. 74, 55 So. 714 (1911) ; Succession of
Eismann, 170 So. 2d 913 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965). The usufruct-naked ownership
disposition is the only device permitted by the Louisiana Civil Code, which gives
the benefit of taxation and succession costs savings of one succession for two
deaths. See Nabors, The Shortcomings of the Louisiana Trust Estates Act and
Some Problems of Drafting Trust Instruments Thereunder, 13 TUL. L. REv. 178,
211 (1939).
258. See LA. R.S. 47:2405 (1950). The figures for the discounted value of
one dollar and for the life expectancy of the usufructuary are obtained from the
tables annexed to the applicable statutes. See Succession of Lewis, 12 So. 2d 7
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1943) ; In ve Stelly's Estate, 185 So. 637 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1939) ; Greco, Valuation of Naked Ownerships, Usufructs, and Annuities Under
Louisiana Inheritance Tax Laws, 10 LA& B.J. 119, 120 (1962). Even if the
actual life span of the usufructuary is known due to his death before the settle-
ment of the estate, the mortality tables are still to be used. See LA. Ops. ATT'Y
GEN. 1689 (1942-44).
259. See Greco, Valuation of Naked Ownerships, Usufructs and Annuities
Under Louisiana Inheritance Tax Laws; 10 LA. B.J. 119, 122 (1962) ; MCIAHON
& RUBIN, PLEADINGS AND JUDICIAL FoRI is ANNOTATED, 11 LSA-CCP Form No.
807 (1964). The value of an annuity is determined by ascertaining the present
value of the annual receipts for every year of the life expectancy of the beneficiary.
The present values are then added together, and the sum total is the present
value of the annuity. Succession of Cotton, 172 La. 819, 135 So. 368 (1931).
260. See Succession of Marsal, 118 La. 212, 42 So. 778 (1907) ; Succession of
Teller, 49 La. Ann. 281, 21 So. 265 (1897) ; Succession of Brown, 94 So. 2d 317
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1957) ; Succession of Gremillion v. Downs, 165 So. 481 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1936). But cf. Liebman v. Fontenot, 275 Fed. 688 (W.D. La. 1921)
(subjecting the usufruct of the surviving spouse to federal estate tax).
The naked ownership of the children of the marriage, however, is subject to the
inheritance tax. See In re Stelly's Estate, 185 So. 637 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1939).
261. See Succession of Baker, 129 La. 74, 55 So. 714 (1911) (confirmation of
legal usufruct by will is not sufficient to change the nature of usufruct into a
testamentary one for purposes of taxation). See also Succession of Brown, 94
So. 2d 317 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1957) ; Succession of Lynch, 145 So. 42 (La. App.
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at least one decision, the surviving spouse is entitled to deduct
the value of the usufruct if children issue of the marriage re-
nounce the inheritance and the survivor acquires one-half of the
community as heir.262
According to article 2951 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Pro-
cedure of 1960, judgments of possession may not be rendered
unless the inheritance taxes have been paid, or satisfactory proof
has been given that no taxes are due, or the maximum amount
claimed by the tax collector has been deposited in the registry
of the court.263 In addition, the legislature has enacted certain
statutes which prohibit banks, homestead associations, corpora-
tions, and other depositary institutions from delivering the de-
ceased's property to anyone until satisfactory proof is given
that the inheritance tax laws have been complied with.264 The
usual proof is a judgment of possession issued by the court hav-
ing jurisdiction over the succession proceedings. Questions thus
Orl. Cir. 1932) (confirmation merely confers the privilege of remarriage without
forfeiture of the usufruct created by law).
262. See Succession of Norton, 157 So. 2d 909 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963). This
solution has been criticized as it implies, contrary to the Civil Code and Louisiana
jurisprudence, that the usufruct of the surviving bpouse pre-exists the inheritance
of the one-half of the community by children of the marriage. See Comment, The
Usufruct of the Surviving Spouse, 25 LA. L. REV. 873, 889 (1965). Of. Succession
of Eisemann, 170 So. 2d 913 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965). Testator left his entire
estate, consisting principally of community property, to his wife. On the authority
of the Norton case, the widow sought to deduct for taxation purposes the value
of usufruct over the deceased's share in the community. The court declared that
"Succession of Norton must be distinguished from this case. There, the existence
of forced heirs created the usufruct of the surviving spouse by operation of law.
Here in the absence of forced heirs, no usufruct ever existed. . . . We hold, there-
fore, that the inheritance tax due on the Succession of Ludwig Eisemann should
be computed on the value of the whole property and there can be deduction
for a nonxistent usufruct by the surviving spouse."
In Succession of Baker, 129 La. 74, 55 So. 714 (1911), note 261 supra, de-
ceased husband had bequeathed to his wife the disposable portion of his estate in
perfect ownership and the remainder in usufruct. Since the only forced heir was
a child of the marriage, the court held that the widow owed taxes on two-thirds
of the deceased's separate property and on two-thirds of his share in the com-
munity property as owner, as well as on one-third of the deceased's separate
property as testamentary usufructuary. No taxes were due on one-third of the
deceased's share in the community property which the widow acquired in usufruct
under article 916 of the Civil Code. If the Norton rule were to be followed, a
surviving spouse in similar circumstances today should be entitled to deduct the
value of the usufruct over the entire one-half of the community.
263. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2951 (1960).
264. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 6:66 (1950) (banks); id. 6:789 (homestead associa-
tions) ; id. 12:503 (corporations). However, motivated by a desire to afford the
surviving spouse some of the means of support in the interim between deceased's
death and a judgment of possession, the legislature enacted special statutes allow-
ing the surviving spouse to withdraw some funds from certain depositary institu-
tions. See, e.g., id. 9:1513 (Supp. 1964) (banks-$1,000.00) ; id. 6:751.1 (home-
stead associations $1,500.00) ; id. 6:664 (credit unions-any amount in deposit in
a joint account).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
arise as to the right of the usufructuary to enjoy the property
in case the naked owner does not discharge his tax liability. In
an early case, the Louisiana Supreme Court declared that the
usufructuary cannot be placed in possession of the property sub-
ject to usufruct before the full payment of taxes levied on the
naked ownership. 265 This solution does not result in defeat of
the rights of the usufructuary. If the usufructuary is also the
succession representative, he can pay the taxes and claim com-
pensation from the heirs when he delivers their virile shares to
them. If anyone else is representative, payment of taxes is
insured by the rule that his discharge is conditional on payment
of all debts.26   And if no representative is appointed and the
heirs refuse to pay the tax, the collector is authorized to obtain
judgment and sell sufficient property to satisfy the judgment.26 7
b. Creation of Usufruct by Acquisitive Prescription
Both the German268 and the Greek Civil Codes 269 declare that
usufruct may be created by acquisitive prescription. This method
for the creation of usufruct, however, is not mentioned in the
French or in the Louisiana Civil Codes. Accordingly, doubts have
been voiced in France as to the availability of this method and
argument a contrario has been drawn from article 690 of the
Code Civil (corresponding to article 765 of the Louisiana Civil
Code of 1870), according to which predial servitudes may be
acquired by acquisitive prescription. This view no longer has
followers in France and commentators are in agreement today
265. SeeIn re Corneil's Estate, 137 La. 702, 69 So. 145 (1915). In the past,
if the surviving spouse exercised actual possession over one-half of the community
as usufructuary and the naked owners had avoided the payment of taxes, question
arose as to liability for penalties. In Succession of Bolan, 158 La. 911, 105 So.
10 (1925), the court held that no penalty was to be paid by the naked owners
upon termination of the usufruct. The inheritance consisted wholly of a dis-
membered title, thq court declared, and thus it would be unfair to hold the heirs
liable for the tax penalty because they paid the inheritance taxes when they be-
came perfect owners instead of when they had only a fragmentary interest. To-
day, it is provided in La. R.S. 47:2422 (1950) that inheritance taxes prescribe
within three years from December 31 of the year in which they become due.
266. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDuRE art. 2951 (1960) ; LA. R.S. 47:2407(c)
(1950).
267. See LA. R.S. 47:2408(b) (1950) ; id. 47:2409(c).
268. As to movables, see B.G.B. § 1033, making applicable by analogy §§ 937-
945 of the same Code. The acquirer of the movables must possess as usufructuary
for ten years. Section 1033 applies even if the movables are lost or stolen, pro-
vided, of course, that the usufructuary be in good faith. See 3, 2 STAUDINGER-
SPRENG, KOMMENTAR ZUM B.G.B. 1113 (lth ed. 1963). As to the immovables,
see B.G.B. § 900 (2). The requisite conditions are: possession by the acquirer for
thirty years as usufruetuary and registration in the land register.
269. See GSFK CIVIL CODE art. 1143. See also ITALIAN CIVIL CODE art. 987;
LAWS Or PuEuTo RIco-Crvu, CODE § 1502; SPANISH CIL CODE art. 648.
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that both predial and personal servitudes may be acquired by
acquisitive prescription. 27 0 This conclusion is supported by the
definition of possession in the Code Civil as "the detention or
enjoyment of a thing or of a right."'271 In the light of today's
doctrine, exclusion of acquisitive prescription as a method for
the creation of usufruct should rest on express legislative pro-
hibition.
The requisite conditions for the creation of usufruct by ac-
quisitive prescription are identical with those governing acquisi-
tion of ownership by prescription. In that respect, the detailed
rules governing acquisition of movables or immovables apply by
analogy. Accordingly, the usufruct of immovables may be ac-
quired in France by good faith possession of ten or twenty years
or by bad faith possession of thirty years.272 With respect to
movables, possession is, in general, equivalent to title under
article 2279 of the French Civil Code. 273 Thus, in cases to which
this article applies, a person who possesses a movable in good
faith as usufructuary is deemed to have acquired the usufruct
thereof even if he derives his title from a non-owner. In cases
to which article 2279 does not apply, the usufruct of movables
may be acquired upon the lapse of three or thirty years. 274
The Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 does not contain a provi-
sion equivalent to article 2279 of the French Civil Code.275 Thus,
a person possessing movables as usufructuary will be protected
against an action brought by the true owner only upon com-
pletion of the three-year prescription, if he is in good faith, or
of the ten-year prescription if he is in bad faith.276 With respect
to immovables, the applicable prescriptions are those of ten or
thirty years. 277
270. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS
766 (2d ed. Picard 1952) ; 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 640 (7th ed.
Esmein 1961).
271. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 2228; Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3426 (1870).
272. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE arts. 2265, 2266, 2262; LA. CIVIL CODE arts.
3475, 3478, 3499 (1870).
273. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 2279; YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY
§127 (1966).
274. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITA PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 698,
766 (2d ed. Picard 1952).
275. See Franklin, Security of Acquisition and of Transaction: La Possession
Vaut Titre and Bona Fide Purchase, 6 TUL. L. REV. 589, 604 (1932).
276. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3506, 3509 (1870) ; YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW
PROPERTY § 148 (1966). 'Naturally, acquisitive prescription is excluded where
the possessor began his possession precariously toward the naked owner. See La.
Civil Code art. 3510 (1870) ; Succession of Heckert, 160 So. 2d 375 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1964).
277. Of. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3475, 3478, 3499 (1870).
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The question of the creation of usufruct by acquisitive pre-
scription has merely theoretical significance insofar as usurpers
are concerned. Since the requisite conditions for the acquisition
of usufruct by prescription are the same as those for the acquisi-
tion of ownership, it is hardly imaginable that a possessor in
bad faith in whose favor the prescription has run will claim
usufruct rather than perfect ownership. But this question has
practical significance in cases where a person has acquired, in
good faith, the right of usufruct from a non-owner. This person
ought to be protected for the same reasons that he would have
been protected if he had acquired perfect ownership.
c. Creation of Usufruct by Operation of Law
Article 916 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870278 accords to
the surviving spouse a right of usufruct over the half of the
community inherited by issues of the marriage. Special legisla-
tion in France 27 9 has likewise accorded to the surviving spouse,
in certain circumstances, a right of usufruct over the entirety
or portions of the estate of the deceased spouse. No such right
has been accorded to the survivor in Greece or Germany. In
these countries, the surviving spouse is protected in a simple
and effective way: in cases of intestate succession, he concurs
with close relatives for a portion of the estate or he is called
to succeed the deceased as his sole heir ;28 and in cases of testa-
mentary succession, the surviving spouse is entitled to a forced
share.28'
278. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 916 (1870), as amended by La. Acts 1844, No.
152: "In all cases, when the predeceased husband or wife shall have left issue of
the marriage with the survivor, and shall not have disposed by last will and
testament, of his or her share in the community property, the survivor shall hold
a [in] usufruct, during his or her natural life, so much of the share of the
deceased in such community property as may be inherited by such issue. This
usufruct shall cease, however, whenever the survivor shall enter into a second
marriage." See also Oppenheim, The Usufruct of the Surviving Spouse, 18 TUL.
L. REV. 181-217 (1943) ; Oppenheim, One Hundred Fifty Years of Succession
Law, 33 TUL. L. REV. 43-58 (1958); Comment, The Usufruct of the Surviving
Spouse, 25 LA. L. REV. 873-92 (1965).
279. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 767, as amended by laws of March 9, 1891,
April 29, 1925, and December 3, 1930.
280. See B.G.B. §§ 1931, 1932; GREEK CIVIL CODE arts. 1820, 1821. Even
testamentary usufructs in favor of the surviving spouse are rare in both Germany
and Greece. In these countries, the Civil Codes allow the creation of family sub-
stitutions and the surviving spouse may well be an instituted heir while children
or other persons the substitutes. B.G.B. §§ 2100-2146; GREEK CIVIL CODE arts.
1923-1941.
1!81. See B.G.B. § 2303; GaEK CIvIL CODE art. 1825.
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Further, article 223 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 ac-
cords to "fathers and mothers . . . during marriage, the enjoy-
ment of the estate of their minor children until their majority
or emancipation. '28 2  Substantially similar rights of enjoyment
are accorded to fathers rather than parents by corresponding
provisions in the French28 and Greek 28 4 Civil Codes. The Ger-
man Civil Code had originally accorded to fathers a right of
enjoyment over the patrimony of their minor children ;285 how-
ever, constitutional and legislative reforms in post-war Germany
resulted in profound modifications of the parent-child relations
and, strictly speaking, in extinction of the parental enjoyment.288
Finally, a widow in necessitious circumstances may claim
under article 3252 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 a privilege
up to the amount of one thousand dollars from the succession
of her husband ;2s7 and the survivor, widow or widower, may
claim under article 2382 of the same Code, under certain circum-
stances, the so-called marital portion from the deceased's es-
tate.28  If the deceased died without children, the survivor is
awarded the amount of the privilege or the marital portion, as
the case may be, 28 9 in perfect ownership. But, in the presence
of children, the survivor merely recevies the sums granted to him
282. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 223 (1870) ; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 239 (1825) ;
LA. CIVIL CODE p. 52 art. 42 (1808) ; Dowling, Parents' Usufruct of Child's Estate
During Marriage, 20 TUL. L. REV. 163-76 (1945).
283. See FRENCih CIVIL CODE art. 384.
284. See GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1517.
285. See B.G.B. §§ 1649-1663 (1900).
286. See PONN CONS9TITUTION (Grundgesetz ftir die Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land) art. 3(2) (1949) ; Law of June 18, 1957 (Gleichberechtigungsgesetz),
effective since July 1st, 1958: 4 SOERGEL-LANGE, BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH
324-29 (9th ed. 1963) ; Beitzke, Betrachtungen zum neuen Kindschajtsrecht, 5
EIIE UND FAMILIE IM PRIVATEN UND 5FFENTLICHEN RECHT 7 (1958) ; Donau,
Das neue Kindschaftsrecht, 11 MONATSCHRIFT FOR DEUTSCHES RECHT 709 (1957),
continued p. 6 (1958) ; Schramm, Die dureh dos Gleisehberectigunggesetz im
Kindschaftsrecht eingetretenen Anderungen, MITTEILUNGEN AUS DER PRAXIS,
ZFINSCHRIFT FOR DAs NOTARIAT Im BADEN-WORTTENBERG 97 (1958).
287. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3252 (1870).
288. See id. art. 2382.
289. The widow "may assert either, but not both, of these rights. . . . She
may . . .assert that one of these rights which will be more advantageous to her
and afford her more protection." Succession of Tacon, 188 La. 510, 513, 177 So.
590, 591 (1938). The assertion of either right is not, as a matter of law, de-
pendent upon the solvency or the insolvency of the succession. But, as a matter
of fact, the widow's privilege is ordinarily claimed from insolvent successions
whereas the marital portion, which is not a privileged claim, is obtained from
solvent estates. Cf. Malone v. Cannon, 215 La. 939, 41 So. 2d 837 (1949), Note,
10 LA. L. REV. 257 (1950); Comment, The Marital Fourth and the Widow's
Homestead, 25 LA. L. REV. 259, 261 (1964).
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in usufruct.2" Articles 3252 and 2382 have no exact equivalents
in the Civil Codes of France, Germany, or Greece. 291
The creation, incidents, and function of legal usufructs in
Louisiana, France, Germany, and Greece have been discussed in
another study.29
2
290. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3252, 2382 (1870).
291. Under article 205 of the French Civil Code, as amended by Law of March
9, 1891,however, the necessitous widow is entitled tc alimony from the succession.
In Germany and in Greece the surviving spouse is amply protected as a forced
heir of the deceased. See note 282 8upra.
292. See Yiannopoulos, Legal Usufruct: Louisiana and Comparative Law, to
be published in a forthcoming issue of this Review.
